THE POLITICS OF RELIGION
THE INVENTION OF “AGAMA” IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRAK

“Agama” (Bahasa Inggris: Religion) merupakan sebuah kata yang serat muatan dengan pandangan-pandangan simplistik bahwa wacana agama melulu mengenai moral dan secara politik penuh dengan kepentingan-kepentingan kekuasaan. Kesederhanaan argumen di atas bukan karena argument tersebut salah, tetapi ada pertanyaan yang lebih valid: “apa makna “agama” seperti yang tersurat dalam karyakarya etnografi komunitas-komunitas adat, asip-asip sejarah, laporan-laporan berita dan kebijakan-kebijakan pemerintah Indonesia?


Tulisan ini mengaitkan wacana mengenai “agama” dengan diskusi mengenai kewarganegaraan. Saya mengajukan sebuah pendapat bahwa wacana “agama” sangat berpengaruh dalam sistem pemerintahan Indonesia; bahwa wacana ini menjadi kekuatan terbesar dalam mendefinisikan konsep kewarganegaraan di Indonesia. Definisii agama yang diproduksi oleh Negara merupakan sebuah retakans ejarah yang menandai sebuah “lapangan kontrol” baru dimana dalam lapangan ini maksi kewarganegaraan diciptakan, dicatat, dikategorikan, dan dikontrol sehingga pengertian mengenai kewarganegaraan ditopang atau dipenggal dari pemahaman “agama” yang sangat spesifikini.


Kata kunci: “agama”, “adat”, “kepercayaan”, citizenship, anthropologi

ABSTRACT

“Agama” (English: Religion) is a heavily loaded word in Indonesia imbued with a simplistic view that the discourse of “agama” is especially about morality but which is also politically motivated by power interests. The simplicity of the argument is not that it is incorrect, but the valid questions here are: “what the meaning of “agama” is as informed by ethnographies of adat communities, historical archives, media reports, and Indonesian state policies?”

This paper examines the ‘condition of possibility’ of the emergence of the discourse of “agama” in Indonesia. Foucault’s theoretical framework is used to investigate the invention of “agama” in Indonesia. Here I limit the discussion to the historical and sociological beliefs and practices that make “agama” possible and focus on “agama” as an operational category in Indonesian politics.
This paper links the discourse on “agama” with the discussion of citizenship. Significant influence of the discourse of “agama” in the Indonesian systems of government, I argue, has become the most powerful force informing the concept of citizenship in Indonesia. The production of state’s definition of the term “agama” was a rupture marking the construction of a new ‘field of control’ in the way in which it creates, registers, categorizes, and controls Indonesians’ citizenship; thus citizenship is reinforced or subverted by this specific meaning of “agama”.

The formalization of “agama” and regularities of the formalized “agama” has consistently been appropriated to legitimate the adoption of every so often violent measures targeting religious minorities in Indonesia. This paper will also highlight the relationship between the discourse of “agama” and the political exclusion of religious minorities in Indonesia.

Keywords: “agama”, “adat”, “kepercayaan”, citizenship, anthropology

INTRODUCTION

In the Indonesian context, some would mindlessly say that “agama” refers to the six “official” religions of Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism and in the same breath consider “agama” to be the equivalent in meaning to “religion” in general. Although we may be able to analyze “agama” in terms of other concepts, such as Judaism or communism, the use of “agama” implies that all Indonesians acknowledge and accept its official meaning, whether they belong to these six formalized religions or not. Such a circumstance cries out for an explanation.

In the past, to say that something was “agama” was not there simply to be found; the word “agama” does not occur in all ethnic societies in Indonesia. There is barely a vocabulary available in great numbers of ethnic languages in Indonesia for translating either “religion” or “agama” (Harahap, 2000; Kuper and Kuper, 2000: 914). These terms are foreign for some Indonesian ethnic groups.

It will be useful to look at the origin and the developments of the word “agama.” “Agama” is a loan word from Sanskrit; it is a “post-Vedic scripture conveying ritual knowledge that is considered to have been revealed by a personal divinity” (Merriam-Webster’ Encyclopedia of World Religions, 1999: 22). From a Srilankan context, “agama” rendered composite meanings: that “agama” is concerned with lokottara (supermundane) matters as opposed to laukoka (worldly) matters (Southwold, 1978). Presenting “agama” in its historical conditions obliges us to recognize its relativity against the deployment of “agama” in other societys, such as in Indonesia.

A mid-sixteenth century law text from Java was labeled The ega am. In their study, M.C. Hoadley and M.B. Hooker refer to “agama” as “traditional learning (overgelevered leer) which could apply equally to any law book”, drawing particularly upon Hindu law following J. C. G. Jonker’s argument (Hoadley and Hooker, 1981: 57-58). In this regard, “agama” is generally understood as a body of prescriptions. The meaning of “agama” shifted and there was already a binary relationship between the concepts of “agama” and “adat”: “agama” here refers to a ‘unified’ Javanese Court legal prescription as opposed to the diverse “adat” of local peripheries. This reasonable first crack would soon give way to the triadic sphere of “agama”, “adat” and “kepercayaan” discussed later.

An interesting point is that majority of Indonesian Muslims do not associate “agama” with the Islamic notion of “din” or use the word. The word “din” refers to (1) custom or mores, (2) rules, (3) laws, (4) oneness of God, (5) obedience, (6) redemption, (7) judgment, (8) Armageddon, (9) advice, and (10) religion (‘Ullumul Qur’an, 1992: 48-50). As the biggest Muslim country in the world, the Indonesian word for “religion” is a word from Sanskrit, not Arabic. Whether the explanation for this partiality is cultural or ideological in nature, there is undoubtedly an element of each.

Ideologically, the appeal of some Islamist groups to an Islamic state has persistently incited the understanding of “din” al Islam not merely as a religion but also a state. The
principle of *din wa dawlah* creates a direct opposition to the ‘secular’ state embodied by both former colonial administrators and the Indonesian republic. One the other hand, cultural studies on how “agama” has been appropriated suggested that “agama” has affinity to including political as well as socio-cultural competitions for authority and domination.

“Agama”, at first glance, more easily is associated with an exclusivist understanding of modern “religion” as referred to by Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1962) in *The Meaning and End of Religion*, made a prevalent study of the reification of “religion” and its logical consequence; modern understandings of “religion” are legitimated as an all-encompassing concept and validated as final and inherent. The modern meanings of “religion” are used: (1) to refer to personal piety, (2) as an ideal and (3) as an empirical phenomenon. These usages refer to a public system. Within this understanding, “religion” as a noun has the plural form and the singular should use definite articles, and (4) as a total generic, ‘religion’ in general.

He conveyed that “...in modern Indonesia agama, from the classical Sanskrit for ‘text’, has come to be used for the Western notion of a religion” (Smith, 1962: 58-59). According to Smith’s assessment, our exposure to the “agama” by itself suffices to explain the “transposition” of the concept of “religion” to other parts of the world outside Greco-Roman Europe. Again, it is important to guard against a misunderstanding that this study would lead to a conclusion that “agama” is the result of a form of ‘religious/cultural imperialism’.

From an Indonesian point of view, Hadikusumo rationalizes the text and context of the definition of “agama” with its reference to Sanskrit. He states that “A means ‘not’ GAM means ‘go’. Suffix ‘a’ is to emphasize the eternal. AGAMA is then commonly understood as an eternal way of life.” (b) According to the ‘Simarigama’, AGAMA was derived from A-GA-MA; A means empty or vacuum, GA means ‘place’ and MA means the ‘Sun’; Agama thus means the teaching of mystery, because God is located in a mysterious place, a vacuum or void ...(c) *Igana* may reflect an abbreviation from the Sanskrit I-GA-MA, where the letter ‘I’ is ‘Iswara’, ‘GA’ is ‘body’ and MA is ‘Amartha’ (life); in this context, *Igana* means the teaching of *kebatinan*, spirituality (Hadikusumo, 1983: 16-17).

The problem here is not just a problem of transporting meanings from India to Indonesia. In fact, this paper discusses the extent to which propositions about “agama” as especially entailed in Indonesia’s system of government constitutes and is constituted by the Indonesian religious reality. I will apply Foucault’s notions of “history of the present” to the innovative ‘imaginative’ construction of the new system of production, distribution, circulation, and operation of the state-imposed “agama”. Through a methodological practice of archeology, this paper explores the ‘condition of possibility’ for the emergence of “agama”.

In this paper, I treat “agama” as the central issue and follow what Foucault has done:

“...to account the fact that is spoken about, to discover who does the speaking, the positions and viewpoints from which they speak, the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said” (Foucault, 1990: 16).

Here “agama” is considered not merely as a concept, but as a priori idea and knowledge that historically situated and contingent. Discourse refers to very specific ways of thinking, a constant manner of utterance considered acceptable by a particular discourse community. What is considered as “true” in this case “agama” is produced and sustained by state apparatus and/or regime of truth such as Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) (Love, 1989). The state apparatus and its fellows play by the rules of exclusion in which it draws the boundary of what is acceptable and what is not about “agama.”

123
By focusing on “part of the ‘complex’ and ‘restrictive’ exchange and communication in a particular system or culture”, it provides a way of exploring religious discourse as an element of ‘limitation’ and ‘exclusion’ practices within a culture (Foucault in Lemert, 1993). Precisely in this regard, this study of the discourse of “agama” is relevant to the project of understanding and changing the inequalities and suppression of religious minorities in Indonesia.

I use this framework for the examination of religious legal provisions, ethnographic researches, and reports on practices of “agama” and its socio-political aspects, mostly from sources available only in Bahasa Indonesia and never before scrutinized with a view to their relevance for understanding contemporary religious discourse in Indonesia.

Later I propose that the influence of the discourse of “agama” is significant in informing the concept of Indonesian citizenry and that the formation of “agama” helped fashion a strategy of exclusion and containment of Indonesian minorities. How the discourse is produced and sustained, as we will discuss later, is related to the politics of exclusion: some people are disqualified from protection of Indonesian law based on a view that these people have no claim to sharing the rights those members of the six “official” religions enjoy as “legitimate” Indonesian citizens.

The common understanding about citizenship grants citizens legal status of political, social and cultural rights. It also sanctions citizens to participate in political institutions and processes, and it also supplies the source of identity (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). The inclusion of citizenship in the discussion is to answer a philosophical critic of Foucault’s framework that “translates antagonism into difference” and the fact that the framework abandons the existing serious unequal power relations among citizens with different (religious) identities, this paper follows Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im who formulated citizenship as:

“Citizenship...demonstrates affirmative and proactive rights of a pluralistic and inclusive political community which confirms and manages potential forms of ‘differences’ among the people and communities to ensure equal rights for all, disregarding their background in religion, sex, ethnicity or political affiliation” (An-Na’im, 2007: 69).

The discourse is clearly central to the state governance, because in many respects the state presence has been especially strong in the field of “agama”. The convincing argument for this is that the state operation of “agama” becomes the key index of citizenship. A valid question for us may be: “What is the meaning of “agama” as informed by the state policies and how citizenship is reinforced or subverted by this meaning?” This question was inspired by Ian Salmon’s article (Salman, 2004: 30).

Consider “agama” as something that we believe we already understand and that we actually know the word, then what surprising difficulty there is in endowing “agama” with a contextualized definition. This is made even more difficult because the discursive domain of “agama” is politics. So, the effort to put “agama” in perspective here is to answer the Foucauldian questions: what kind of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconscious modes of thought are written into, and often hidden within, “agama”? How has such discourse been able to operate in Indonesia from independence until today?

Situating the discourse as a formalized way of thinking of what “agama” is and what can be said about it is different from situating the discourse of “agama” in action. Because politics situate the discourse in action, we will discuss the politics of religions as well as the problem that arises when “agama” is appropriated in daily life. The discourse is clearly central to state governance, because in many respects the state presence has been especially present in the field of “agama”. The convincing argument for this is that the state operation of “agama” becomes the key index of citizenship.
DISCUSSION

"Agama" in the shadow of the State

Early in the beginning of the Indonesian state, the moment Indonesian nationalists decided to declare Indonesian independence, the constitutional makers had to immediately confront the issue of religion. The issue of the state’s foundation preceded the issue of democracy; whether or not the Indonesian state should be based on Islam and how the state should govern religious life trumped the question of the structure of the state should it be unitary or federal, and whether Indonesia should become a republic or a monarchy (Bolland, 1971).

The conflict over the issue of state ideology was already brought before the meeting of the Badan Pemeriksa Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Japanese, Dokuritu Jumiki Chosakai), a Japanese-sponsored committee known as the Investigative Committee for the Preparation of Independence in late May and June 1945 (Mudzhar, 1993: 24). The main purpose of the meeting was actually to determine the territorial boundaries to be claimed by an independent Indonesian state (Thoelen, 1987: 36).

Indeed, the making of the Indonesian constitution demonstrated a commitment to regulate the cultural and religious diversity of Indonesian populations in mutual coexistence. The Indonesian state adopted Pancasila as the state ideology and foundation. For many Indonesians, Pancasila reflects the ideals of tolerance under which the state gives official recognition to religious groups in Indonesia (Hidayah, 2009). But why did “agama” matter in the first place?

There are two ways to reconstruct the “condition of possibility” of “Agama”. The first is namely the People’s Assembly in which the discourse of “agama” was first established in 1952. That year The Ministry of Religions (formerly Kementerian Agama which later became the Ministry of Religious Affairs) proposed a restricted definition of “agama”. The idea was this: to be legitimated as an ‘official’ religion, a particular religion should have a prophet and a holy book, and also be acknowledged internationally.

In 1961, the Ministry of Religion (Menteri Agama) again proposed the perimeter of “agama” as indicating equal validity as gestured in the previous propositions. “Agama” as authorized by the Indonesian state includes requirements that it (1) be an encompassing way of life with concrete regulations, (2) a teaching about the oneness of God; (3) include a holy book, which codifies a message sent down to prophet(s) through a holy spirit; and (4) be led by a prophet. The state views all religions outside these limitations as ‘tribal’ beliefs, and therefore are ‘superstitious’ within the working frameworks of this discourse. With the Ministry of Home Affairs (Menteri Dalam Negeri) decree No. 477/74054 on November 15th 1978, the government explicitly states that the religions ‘acknowledged’ in Indonesia are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism.

If we ask which reality obtained in these state propositions, we can respond that all Indonesians’ religious beliefs and practices are subject to them. It is important to observe that not all Indonesians were committed to this ordering. Thus “agama” as a ‘field of control’ has no parallel in pre-independence Indonesia. Even though according to Regeeringsreglement article 119, (1854), the Dutch ruler acknowledged the freedom of religions and pledged the government to a neutral position regarding religions, Indonesians have never experienced a ‘secular’ governing system (Sadik, 2004: 34-48). The Dutch went so far as forbidding Islamic instructions and providing incentives for Protestant missionaries (Noer, 1982).

In the colonial era, regardless of the stated Dutch policy of neutrality and freedom of religions, religious policy was principally an Islamic policy, an Islam-centered policy of controlling religion (Steenbrink, 2006; Benda, 1958).

A restricted understanding of “agama” that is devoid of a cultural and historical context has become the main
problem here. Hundreds of indigenous beliefs and practices, as well as many schools of interpretation within world religions (for example: Ahmadiyah, Baha'i, Jehovah Witnesses) are not “legitimate” because these groups fall outside boundaries established within the discourse. Adding to this serious problem is that the New Order regime establishes the triadic discourse of “agama”, “adat” and “kepercayaan”.

This complication has to do with the claim that addressing “agama” does not automatically exclude either “adat” or “kepercayaan” addressing them as the absolute others. Many religious beliefs and practices may not be clearly categorized as such. “Agama” reaffirms “adat” and “kepercayaan” while they also coexist in antagonism. For that reason, the rhetoric of, for example, Aluk ta Dolo, Amatoa, Parmalim or Susila Budi that they are not “agama” is never culturally convincing.

From the perspective of the binaries of “agama”/“adat” and “agama”/“kepercayaan”, “agama” gives almost no indication as to what Indonesians believe or practice. Instead, “agama” is situated within two other spheres: the politics of adat communities that transcend cultural diversities and the hegemony of monotheistic purity that averts Indonesian syncretistic cosmology.

Following that reasoning, can we speak of “kepercayaan” if there is no “agama” in mind? Would it also be absurd if we speak of indigenous beliefs without knowingly adding “agama” in front of “adat” (to form the phrase “agama adat”)? Without the state’s interference, would it be possible, in a way, for “agama”, “adat” and/ or “kepercayaan” to exchange places?

At a political level, professing a religion is a political decision in Indonesia and a ‘legitimate’ religion may well identify citizenship. Focusing on the binary of “agama” and “kepercayaan”, the subsequent paragraphs will discuss the political effect of religious discourse in Indonesia. Here I will argue that the politics of religion is the most powerful force in forming the concept of “citizenship” in Indonesia. Essentially, Indonesian citizenship is given iiessanguinis (either from an Indonesian father or mother, or both) and a partial ius soli (Indonesian Law No.26/2006). Arguing religion as the key index of citizenship, “religion” sets the boundaries of citizenship: only those professing ‘legitimate’ religions are to be considered as citizens.

Here I propose that the discourse of “agama” is the key aspect in the constitution of the citizen subject. Within this operating framework, the state attempts to construct citizenry through the categorization and registration of citizen religious affiliation. To give an empirical grounding to this inquiry, I will use secondary reports and testimonials that extend the discussion on legal and bureaucratic procedures of civil administration in regards to “adat” and “kepercayaan”.

**Negara Mawa Tata, Desa Mawa Cara:**
**The state (city or court) has its rule, the villages their ways.**

In a country where over 85% of its population is Muslim, Muslim citizens sought to establish the idea that religions other than Islam should be accorded legitimacy by the majority. This can be traced back to the persistent efforts by Muslim factions to ‘define’ what “agama” is a position disregarding the constitutional prescription that “the national parliament does not privilege any particular religious community”. Muh.Dimyati, a member of the national parliament, pushed for a ban on aliran kepercayaan.

The distinction between “agama” and “kepercayaan” was formulated according to the Ministry of Religion Decree No. 9/1952/Article VI as “A current of belief... a dogmatic opinion, which is closely connected to the living tradition of several tribes, especially of those tribes that are still backward. The core of their belief is everything which has become the customary way of life of their ancestors overtime” (Supartha, 2004:9). Accordingly, in
1953, the government acknowledged seventy two (72) aliran kepercayaan; these ‘alirans’, according to the Minister of Religions K. H. Masjukur, “in essence do not meet the prerequisite of "agama"” (Drivorkara, 2007; Majalah Praba, 1953).

The effort to ‘define’ agama was so profound that a yearlater the Ministry of Religion reported that there were 360 ‘new agamas’ in Indonesia. It was in 1954 that the Ministry of Religion set up Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (PAKEM), a watchdog for the Ministry of Religion, to monitor and control aliran kepercayaan in Indonesia. Finally, in 1959, the parliament finally demanded a definition of “agama”. A committee under the Minister of Religion, Ahmad Wahid Wahab, specified prerequisites for the definition of “agama”: A holy scripture, a prophet, a belief in the absolute all-powerfulness of God and a system of law for its believers.

In 1960 PAKEM was placed under the authority of the Attorney General (Kejakasaan Agung). Tap MPR No 2, 1960 sanctified the definition of 1952 (God, holy book, and world acknowledgment). Again in 1961 the Minister of Religion restated the prerequisites for the definition of “agama” to exclude aliran kepercayaan, and at this very moment the authority was given to the national military forces to ensure that the statute would be well enforced. In the State Police Primary Law (Undang-undang Pokok Kepolisian Negara) No. 13/ 1961, the Police are authorized to impose preventive and repressive acts to control aliran kepercayaan considered a threat to Indonesian populations.

All those defining debates brought to the surface valid tensions around what “agama” is. The pressure resulted in President [Soekarno]’s Decree No. 1/1965 naming the six legitimate Indonesian religions Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism and Confucianism. According to Ramstedt, Protestantism and Catholicism seen as two distinct religions in Indonesia is a legacy from the colonial period, especially from the ‘pillarization’ (verzuiling) of Dutch society at the end of the nineteenth century. Pillarization "ensured that Catholics received equal political rights and representation in public life as well as within the Dutch Bureaucracy” (Ramstedt, 2004: 29).

This does not mean that other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, Taoism, etc. are prohibited in Indonesia. So long as their adherents do not need identity cards, marriage licenses, birth certificates, or passports—things that are impossible to do without in a modern state. But this succeeded in abolishing all aliran kepercayaan from posing as “religions”. The response of this state of affairs, beginning with the failed attempted coup in 1965 and extending until 1969, was that the army was busy eradicating aliran kepercayaan groups accused of being infiltrated by Communism, and religious differentiation within the terms of Indonesian citizenship was introduced (Hefner, 2001: 35).

A compromise was reached for aliran kepercayaan to accommodate their claim to the status of “agama” in 1973 when parliament allowed various aliran kepercayaan, kebatinan and indigenous religious groups to function under the separate but equal status of kepercayaan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa (the belief in the divine omnipotence) under the ministry of Education and Culture. State recognition of “kepercayaan” was articulated in Tap MPR RI No IV/MPR/1973 March, 22 1973.

It was an absurd compromise; according to the State, agama is defined as the belief in the divine omnipotence kepercayaan kepada Tuhan yang Maha Esa. According to the decision to relegate it to the status of a non-religion, an aliran kepercayaan can not even be queried as to whether it satisfies the prerequisites for “agama”. This, one may argue, is not a compromise at all. The
so-called ‘compromise’ was to put an end to the question of whether “kepercayaan” was religion.

A Minister of Home Affairs Decision (Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri) in November 1978 No. 477/74054, written in reference to the procedure for filling the “agama” section on the Citizens Identity Card, named only five recognized religions. Confucianism was thus excluded from the state’s recognition. This decision was annulled on March 21st 2000 by President Abdurrahman Wahid, allowing Indonesians to include Confucianism as their religion on their identity cards. In 2006 the House of Representatives passed the Citizenship Administration Law guarantee that every citizen, including those professing kepercayaan, “agama adat” or kebatinan, can claim their civil rights for the registration of notable occurrences such as marriage, death, and birth events.

The law UU No. 23, 2006 grants acknowledged universal civil rights as stated in the verse 64, article 1 and 2 in which each Indonesian should register her/himself and for those whose religions are not yet acknowledged as “agama” or affiliated to adat may leave the religious affiliation slot blank and their civil registration will be recorded.

The dispute over “agama” was broadened to include almost all aspects of citizens’ administration in Indonesia: marital registration, birth certificates, identity cards, religious education in public school, censorship and so on. And larger problems lurk over how to regard certain beliefs and ritual practices that fall outside the prerequisite of “agama” in Indonesia (Kipp and Rogers, 1987: 21).

Examinations of the state politics of identity and of programs of the Ministry of Religious affairs are some of these considerations. The politics of defining “religion” is one thing and the social reality is another. There can be no sense to the idea that “kepercayaan” and “agama” are in a clear distinction constraining the syncretic nature of daily practices ‘out there’. There are multiple articulations of religious pluralism, not only the diversity of so called (world) religions, but also the contesting different ideologies, traditions, and understandings within a given religion. In order to fully understand how “agama” functions in an Indonesian context, we had better extend the discussion to the practice of governing citizens in various local communities.

The issue of identity is interesting here. Whereas Indonesians’ indigenous religions are predisposed to facilitate narrow identities based on primordial allegiances, (world) religions endorse a broader identity based on a shared unitary state-imposed orthodoxy. This is one reason why the politics of identity is so complex in Indonesia; a member of an adat community must comply with often conflicting regulations in ministries such as the Ministry of Forestry, Home Affairs, Human Resources and Transmigration, as well as the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The ‘identity’ problem does not always refer solely to the administrative mechanism of citizenship. For example, for more than thirty years, some Indonesians and especially adat communities have been labeled as Communists (Webb and Farram, 2005).

When the Communist Party was outlawed in 1966 so were people who had been ‘granted’ labels as Communists. The ‘communist’ label was constructed as synonymous with ‘atheist’ in order to create popular acceptance of the judgment that communists were not only a threat to the liberal state, but were also the latent enemy of conservative religious people in Indonesia. The issue of communism involved the state through the army, for instance, forcefully monitoring the self-identity of members of the adat communities. The communist purge was not just a ‘struggle for power to govern’ as goes the jargon within political frameworks, but was also a systemic ‘genocide’ of many religious communities in Indonesia.

There are probably no institutions capable of exercising stronger social control than world religions and state apparatus.
Religious elites and the State apparatus elites in Indonesia, according to Daniel Dakikidae (2003), are involved in a ‘fellowship of discourse’. Within the fellowship of discourse the state elites and the world religions, especially of Islam, are capable of excluding the politics of exclusion in at least two ways.

First, the State’s recognition only of (world) religions is an intentional exclusion of hundreds of native religious belief systems in Indonesia.

Secondly, in connection with the state’s recognition, religion in one way or another creates an entry barrier so as to encourage or discourage other claimants to the status of “religion”. Entry barriers for religions other than the six recognized religions are manifest in the state’s limiting financial support and labeling tribal religions as “animist” in official documents, including in the constitution and the decisions of the national parliament. An example is the Presidential Decree No. 14 (1967) of the Prohibition of the Public Practice of Chinese Religions and Customs which says that this decree was introduced to protect Indonesian citizens from “unnatural influence on the psychology, mentality, and morality” of Chinese religions, beliefs and customs (Suryadinata, 1998).

Because religion is so important in national affairs, there are many different agencies involved with it, and each one has its own hierarchy of bureaucrats who together constitute formidable entry barriers. In cooperation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs is responsible for the recognition of religions in Indonesia. The army and the Attorney General with its PAKEM constitute yet other entry barriers (Dakikidae, 2003: 554-560).

The issue of citizenship has become the currency of the Indonesian state. Citizenship is sometimes conflated with one’s given ‘nationality’, an abstract notion narrowly grasped by Indonesians, especially those who live in remote adat communities areas. The new subject inscribed in the politics of religions creates and legitimizes a new subject not as a carrier of rights, but of norms (social consent through hegemony) rather than mere legal regulation.

Until recently, gaining religious citizenship from positive legal documents was a problematical undertaking. Civil courts may grant citizenship status, but only after extensive deliberation from the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs and local administration offices. Practically, even the effort to name a “religion” on an Identity Card presents an uncanny predicament. It has been a common situation that when citizens apply for an Identity Card, by entering “Confucianism” in the space specifying “Religion” on the application form, it would usually appear on the card itself as “Buddhism” (Yang, 2005). So it has been for the Bahai’s, whose card would mysteriously list “Hinduism”. And for the latest electronic ID card, those who profess “kepercayaan” should leave empty the “Religion” space. The Identity card begs the question concerning our discussion of religious discourse in Indonesia. In 1951, the Soekarno government introduced the Identity Card. After the government defined a citizen’s identity, the Indonesians had to have a fixed, i.e. unchangeable, identity.

From the experience of Javanese, who constitute more than forty percent of Indonesians, a ‘fixed’ religious affiliation was relatively rare as was a ‘fixed’ name. Javanese have a ‘childhood name’ and a ‘mature’ name. Some have a completely different name or just add ‘religious name’ after reaching a certain stage of maturity, usually marked by marriage. Changing names is also a usual occurrence when the original name is considered ‘bad’; that is, when the name does not suit someone’s personality or is perceived to bring misfortune. Religious affiliation was a matter of ‘natural changes’. We can turn to Andrew Beatty on his study of Slametan ritual to give an Eastern Javanese context.

“The very adaptability of the slametan has made conversion from Islam to Hinduism and sometimes back again less troublesome than one might imagine. As a ritual frame adaptable to diverse faiths and ideologies, it...
remains at the heart of Javanese religion. As an example of religious syncretism, it shows how and with what inventive grace people can come to terms with their differences” (Beatty, 1999).

On a different level of analysis, the religious discourse into “agama” and “adat” offers a different level of binary pairs based on the fundamental principle that “adat” is not ‘religious’, and that “adat” is the ultimate expression of culture. The State imposes the demarcation of “adat” from “religion” as a control mechanism. Considered as hindering nationalistic and progressive ideals, “adat” is preserved as an object of nostalgia and tourism. Next I will extend the inquiry into consequences of the discourse of “agama” in Indonesia. It presents a religious narrative drawn from ethnographies of adat communities in Indonesia. The purpose being is to provide a sociological translation of the appropriation of “agama” in the modern Indonesian state.

The State has It’s Rule, Villages their Ways

The Indonesian government has deliberately placed “adat” within the cultural sphere, distinguishing it as separate from other elements of adat communities’ cosmology, especially those involving belief systems. In so doing, the government imposes “adat” as “a gloss for allegedly immutable cultural forms that are held to distinguish one collectivity, such as a village or ethnic group, from another” (Spyer, 1996: 28). The assumption that “adat” is immutable has always been the grounds for discouraging adat communities from participating in the processes of Indonesian politics, economics, education, and other compartmentalized “modern progress”.

The government’s stance toward “adat” also reflects the institutionalized concept of the colonial Dutch administrators. Patricia Spyer (1996: 28) examines the genealogy of “adat” and comes to the deduction that “adat” is “clearly developed within the historical context of a complex interaction between Dutch hegemonic ambitions, colonial practice of rule (or divide and rule), foreign religions, and the political affiliations that ordered the population of the Malay region along religious and ethnic lines.” The native populations were segregated between those who were adat subjects, Muslims, Christians, oriental descendant subjects, etc all subjects who were not to interact with each other. This reasoning is important; as a result the Dutch constructed “adat” and “agama” (Islam) as antagonistic opposites.

Indonesian governments, especially during the Soeharto regime, established a firm vision that the Republic is an indigenous state all Indonesians are equally indigenous (asli) (Li, 2000). Populations living in the former Netherlands East Indies territory were automatically Indonesian citizens. Except those who had no rights of citizenship or had double citizenship because of the different Indonesian nationality laws that are entirely based on ius soli (similar to the Netherlands) while other states apply the ius sanguinis principle, such as the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and India, which have been the State of origin of many Indonesian ‘foreign descendants’. This idea epitomizes the Soeharto government’s (and other presidencies) policy of not officially employing ethnicity (and race) in government discourses. Ethnicity is not marked on the citizens identity card, no official body exists for dealing with ethnic groups or race (which exist in Malaysia, Vietnam or United States), and there are no separate laws affecting various different ethnic groups. However, there are multiple departments and rulings dealing with remote tribal communities and religious affairs.

Thomas A. Reuter has put the point vividly in his study of Bali Aga, in Custodians of the Sacred Mountain. Bali Aga practices its own form of Hinduism within Hindu Bali. In the broader context of religion discourse, Reuter cites the most recent and invasive intervention of the state as having created serious ruptures in the Bali Aga community. Reuter agrees that the politics of “agama” and “adat” facilitate state interference in
almost all *adat* communities in Indonesia. The state policy in Bali Aga is manifested in state institutions such as Badan Pelaksana Pembina Lembaga Adat (the Executive Body of Adat Institutions Administration) and Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (Indonesian Hindu Dharma Council). (Reuter, 2005: 423). These executive bodies have the prerogative to impose changes on *adat* organizations all over Bali: in the case of Bali Aga this body forced the *klanadat*, an normative assembly for the Balinese mainstream, to replace *uluwapad*, a distinctive *adat* assembly of eight ‘pairs of elders’ in the Bali Aga community.

The greatest antagonism from Bali Aga toward ‘national’ religious policy can be seen in their refusal of *meru* and *padnasama*. *Meru* is a tall pura with an ascended roof, and *padnasama* is a stone throne for Sang Hyang Widhi, the highest Hindu god according to the Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia, responding to the state requirement that only monotheist faiths can be recognized as “*agama*” (Reuter, 2005: 96). The mandatory requirement that all ritual should be led by *Brahmana* priests is a tremendous problem for the Bali Aga community, which has not in the past attached much importance to a caste system. Reuter implicitly argues that for the Bali Aga community, “*agama*” cannot be separated from “*adat*” in the way that such separation is expected by the state as in the case of ‘the pairs of elders’ that symbolize the unity of the secular and the religious (Reuter, 2005: 327-336).

A similar case has been made for the Tengger community of East Java. Robert W. Hefner had a similar point of departure in studying the Tengger of East Java: their ritual. Hefner refuted the arguments that the Tengger community is an ethnic enclave separate from the larger Javanese ethnic group. However, the distinctive characteristic of Tengger ritual was that it was always conducted in a formal liturgy performed by a specific kind of village priest. The survival of the Tengger priesthood, found nowhere else in modern Java, emphasized the uniqueness of Tengger tradition (Hefner, 1985: 8).

Hefner elucidated the tradition with “*adat*” as a starting point. Hefner stated that “*adat*” is often posed in opposition to “*agama*” and that the distinctive characteristic of “*adat*” which, at least according to him, comes from an orthodox Muslim point of view is limited by an understanding that “the belief and practices to which it refers are not divinely inspired” (Hefner, 1985: 37). In this discussion, Hefner does not conclude that *adat* is “secular” in opposition to “*agama*,” the religious. Rather, he argues that because of the variation of *adat* from region to region, *adats* quite different from agama. Further Hefner argues that “the complex history of adat makes it difficult to hypostatize the cultural content of adat throughout Indonesia” and that the substance of *adat* is not an assortment of a-historic and immutable “traditional customs” (Hefner, 1985: 38). Elaboration on the differences between *adat* and religion are best articulated in Hefner’s words: “...it is difficult to argue that any one set of traditions is inherently superior to another except when one is talking about what is best for one’s own community” (Hefner, 1985: 38). Relativistic but grounded legitimatizations are things “*agama*” could not provide in a plural world of diverse tradition and cultural differences in Indonesia.

As in the case of Bali Aga, the Tengger community is in “the politically awkward position of professing a faith not recognized as legitimate” by the state (Hefner, 1985: 41). Even though the, partly state-initiated, movement for Tengger affiliation with Balinese Hinduism had already begun in the 1950’s, Tengger’s self-proclamation of Javanese Hinduism (sometimes the case is more confused with the native words of “*Buda Tenger*”) has made affiliation with Balinese Hinduism very thorny to this day.

The State’s policy that every citizen should profess one of the six recognized religions has resulted in Tengger self-identification as Hindu increasing significantly, from eight to sixteen villages (Hefner, 1985: 239). Interestingly, Hefner argues that the driving force for Hindu
affiliation was not “the collapse of traditional beliefs as to the nature of the supernatural, but the problem of self-definition and legitimization posed by increased involvement in an Indonesian society in which Islam is the dominant religious idiom.” This is an interesting account since many descriptions tend to conclude that Tengger affiliation with Hinduism is a romanticized sentiment, as it is absent of “authentic Tenggerness” (Nuruddin and Deden F., 2003; Nurkhoiron and Waluyo, 2005).

Hefner discussed the religious life of the Tengger in the context of Islamization and the penetration of modernist Hinduism (Parasada Hindu Dharma version) in the region (Bruinesen, 1999: xxvii). Hefner implied that Tengger Parasada is better viewed as a guardian of priestly ritual tradition rather than as a reformer, compared to its Balinese counterpart. We may assume that Hefner’s statement is true only if we ignore the missionary movement after 1962, when some village leaders (kepala desa) invited government superiors to witness a formal declaration identifying the Tengger as a Hindu society (Hefner, 1985: 250). After 1962, Parasada sent Balinese-trained Hindu teachers to Tengger. The most notable change in Tengger was the erection of Balinese-inspired Hindu Pura (temple) in the Poten area, a place where the village priest had normally led the Tengger’s traditional ritual prior to 1996.

While Hefner refutes the ‘repression hypothesis,’ there were two contradictory decisions from Parasada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI) relevant here. The first was letter No. 00/SK/PHDI-Jatim/ 1973 on the establishment of PHDI in Probolinggo District, which included the Tengger. Another letter, No. 00/PHDI-Jatim/Kept/73, on March 6th, 1973 categorized the Tengger community as Buddha Mahayana. In yet another account prior to 1973, in 1968 a handful of ‘researchers’ visited the Tengger, and in a short visit, those ‘researchers’ decided that the Tengger community was basically a Hindu community (Nurkhoiron and Waluyo, 2005). Such differing categorizations of so basic an element of identity were not unique to these two communities.

Look at the case of Tobaku studied by Lorraine V. Aragon. The Field of the Lord is a study of a Christian mission and its influence on the modern Tobaku community. Aragon thus argues that the picture of the mission and its project of modernization “has been a government policy of economic expansion and enforced nationalism as much as a policy of selective religious intervention” (Aragon, 2000: 24). According to her account, the state has a different rhetoric for realizing its goals. Not of “agama” and “kepercayaan”, but of “agama” vs. “adat”.

This argument is intimately familiar through the writing of Ann Schiller. In Schiller’s analysis of the Ngaju people, she portrayed the southern Borneo peoples in the past as professing a “private ecstatic religious practice in an array of kin group-centered rituals.” It was only after the state’s intrusion into religious policy, in the mid 1950’s, that the indigenous belief system and practices were given a name Kaharingan (Schiller, 1996: 412).

In the former times, within this indigenous belief system, the high god was perceived as not actively participating in human affairs. Most rituals and prayers were directed at ‘middle’ supernatural beings including ancestors and guardian spirits. Schiller’s statements resonate with Rita S. Kipp and Susan Rodger’s assessment that “local rituals in many ethnic homelands may not have been conceptualized as components of a distinctive and systemic domain (Kipp and Rodgers, 1987: 3).

The ‘high god’ aspect has often been emphasized in the ‘monotheistic’ discourses of Indonesians. Quoting Schärer’s study via Joseph Weinstock (Kipp and Rodgers, 1987: 78) on Kaharingan, the Ngaju version of Kaharingan acknowledges the spirit multitude and notes that the high God does not play a major part in the life of the Ngaju peoples, yet Weinstock ignores the relative insignificance of the monotheistic aspect of Kaharingan. The
issue of monotheism is a pervasive issue since the belief in an all-embracing God is the *sine qua non* of Indonesian ideology.

The rhetoric of “agama” has also been internalized successfully in public Ngaju consciousness. The religious body of the Union of *Kaharingan Dayaks of Indonesia* initiated codification of *Kaharingan* belief and practice approximating the doctrine and creeds of world religions, especially Islam and Christianity: sermons were modeled on the Bible, recitation of the ‘five pillars of faith’ resembles those of Islamic “imans”, ritual modeled the posture adopted by Balinese Hindus and, of course, the prominence of the notion of a supreme Deity (Schiller, 1996: 414).

Examination of *adat* in the colonial context by John R. Bowen in *Law, Equality and Islam in Indonesia* (2003) provides a few brilliant insights. The Dutch stance on *adat* by and large was motivated, he insisted, by fear of the potentially unifying force of Islam in the Dutch East Indies (Aragon, 2000: 160).

In the course of the nineteenth century, the colonial system was based on, according to Bowen, legal pluralism. Europeans in the Dutch East Indies abided by the civil and criminal code as it was in the Netherlands, but the native populations had separate courts. Perhaps well to consider is how different courts were related to racial separation in the Dutch East Indies. Religion did matter for racial separation; prior to *regeringsreglement* article 119, the Dutch East Indies natives professing Christianity could be included as European according to Algemeene Besluit van Wetgeving (Ketetapan Umum Perundang-undangan).

Since the division was provocative for native Muslims, the colonial administrator later changed the category to be based on racial characteristics: European, Chinese and Eastern Asia descendants, Arabs and Southern Asia descendants, and in the bottom of the hierarchy were the native Indies *priyumi*. Based on racial separation, the Dutch colonial established *Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken* (the Office of Natives’ Affairs) (Saidi, 2004: 34-35).

This racial separation was separated from legal pluralism, since the courts were appointed according to this racial division. The native Indonesians were submitted to nineteen *adat* law jurisdictions, *adat recht*, whose jurisdictions were, according to legal experts, limited to the native *priyumi*. This was when *adat* became a binding legal system; *adat* law ceased as a mechanism for maintaining the harmony and balance of the society and universe. *Adat* sanction was then used as positive law, to punish criminals and violations of civil order and to segregate different ethnic groups (Aragon, 2000). Since then, the commands of the ancestors became prescriptive and isolative laws.

Bowen assessed that the changed ‘function’ of *adat* was a creation of colonial authorities. The colonial authorities created native *adat* ‘institutions’ to effectively govern the native population. In brief, Dutch administrators, (and some anthropologists in this regard), “developed a science of Indies adatrecht...to systemize administration, to produce laws for the natives, to study local culture, and to keep Islamic law at bay” (Bowen, 2003: 46).

Bowen elucidated the relation of *adat* law, Islamic jurisdiction and colonial legal law in his chapter of “Remapping Adat”. Important to note here is “that colonial adat law was intended to be not just a set of administrable rules” (Bowen, 2003: 48), but also a charge against the idea of a ‘public role of Islam’. Within Hurgronje’s famous systematization, law was seen as the very aspect in which Islam was perceived ‘to have lost touch with the real world’: “Islam was not located anywhere, and thus could be said to have no social or cultural existence” (Bowen, 2003: 51).

Here Bowen makes clear how the discourse around *adat* was used to undermine Islam. The polarization of “*adat*” and “agama” which was really a polarization of “*adat*” and “Islam” was established. The fundamental political consideration for the colonial administrator was how to preserve political distinctions among groups of
people as contained in varieties of adat law (Bowen, 2003: 50). To undermine Islam, according to Bowen, colonial administrators were informed that the nature of adat codes were equally descriptive and prescriptive, colonial administrators were conditioned to see adat as ‘eminently subject to empirical verification’, “the prescriptive had no source other than practice or habit, and thus relied on their descriptive accuracy.” Thus, “under the conception of adat, a rule loses its normative force and its legal standing” including rules from of Islamic law.

In Bowen’s analyses, Dutch adat law is the root of and the model for New Order non–legal representations of Indonesian ‘unity in diversity’. In the reign of the Soeharto regime, adat was seen as the ‘highest point of material culture’ (puncak-puncak tertinggi kebudayaan nasional): marriage customs, dances, clothes, house styles, etc, one of each province, is best illustrated in Taman Mini Indonesia Indah. The New Order adat-as-culture and the Dutch legacy of adat-as-law are a duality within which adat was both uprooted from the socio-cultural context of particular societies and detached from its religious aspect.

The New Order government contains religious discourse only within the six recognized religions. Thus, accommodating most recognized world religions requires radical changes in the meaning and function of elements of local adat, in both religious and material aspects. The New Order policy in this discussion is best illustrated by the 1985 Cultural Policy that “care is taken that destructive superstitions are not tolerated in these local beliefs. All local groups must have a belief in God (Soebadio, 1985: 13-14). Due to the strength and endurance of this perceived contradiction between traditional ‘superstitions’ and religion, many local [material] cultures often no longer possess their original religious function.

To be clear, Geertz assessed adat in an understanding that “adat” means “something half-way between ‘social concensus’ and ‘moral style’…” (Geertz, 1983). One problem which bedevils a sensible discussion of “adat” is, in Geertz’s view, the reductive interpretation of adat to habit a kind of routine where it is reduced to practice found in everyday life. As a consequence, “adat” by definition was understood wrongly as ‘a set of traditional rules traditionally applied to traditional problems’. Here the mischief is exaggerated by the State’s aggressive policy of promoting modernization. In the New Order legacy, adat was no longer relevant in modern times, neither culturally or religiously.

In the same light, consider Jane Monnig Atkinson. Atkinson noted that “agama” actually covers a somewhat narrower range than it does in the English translation “religion” (Kipp and Rodgers, 1987: 21). In the Indonesian state context, religion’s meaning very much overlaps with “adat”, yet at the same time “religion” in a narrower definition claims opposition against “adat”. The rigid dichotomy of “agama” and “adat” is repeatedly differentiated by the level of abstractness. Many traditional societies provide good support that there were initially cohesive systems of life. For this reason, “the perceptual dichotomy of adat and agama while not necessarily distinct in the minds or lives of the people is very real and critical to the functioning of the State” (Kipp and Rodgers, 1987: 74).

An exceptionally brief account from R. Schlofeld on the Mentawai people and Sven Cedderoth on the Sasak community will illustrate governmental policies regarding the religions of adat communities:

“Adat community hardly corresponds to the image of national Indonesian personality, and everything was undertaken to adapt them to it as soon as possible. In 1954 a decree was promulgated prohibiting their traditional religion, which was said to be heathen, all the inhabitants were given three months to decide whether they wanted to [sic!] Christianity or to Islam. Anyone who did not choose within this period was threatened with punishment by the police or by mission teachers, and his ritual equipment was burned. Coupled with this were governmental measures to turn the longhouses that lay at irregular intervals
along the rivers into tidy, surveyable villages with a church and a school. At the same time, external features such as glass-beaded jewelry, the long hair of the men, loin cloths, tattoos, and the custom of chiseling the incisors to a point were forbidden as marks of un-Indonesian primitiveness” (Schifold, 1998).

Sven Cederoth affirmed a similar case from Lombok. On May 2, 1967, two years after the 1965 coup de etat attempt, one village of the Sasak community received an announcement that the government had decided the five officially recognized religions (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism and Hinduism) and that everyone had to belong to one of these religions. They were urged to choose one of these official recognized religions within three months. The women were not asked to register their choice. Three-quarters chose Buddhism, others Islam. The Ministry of Religions apparatus assigned Pansipat Hindu Dharma (the Council of Hindu Dharma Indonesia) to set an inauguration. The signed lists were given to civil, military and police authorities. Fifty out of 500 who had listed themselves as Buddhists attended the inauguration, and many of them “felt that they had by way of a detour been made Hindus rather than Buddhists” (Cederoth, 1996).

In Cederoth’s account, the ‘politics of religion’ in Lombok included the burning of the syncretic watu tulu mosque; the destruction of the sacred sanctuary including lingam-yoni; and the addition of religious education classes; the publication of a book about watu tulu as aliran kepercayaan, as well as various missionary works from Muslim organizations such as Nahdatul Wathan and Muhammadiyah (Bartholomew, 2002) and Wali Umat Buddha Indonesia (the Councils of Indonesian Buddhists). Theravada Buddhist monks were also sent during this period (Avonius, 2004; Cederoth, 1996).

By having members of the Sasak community choose a religion from the menu of five acceptable faiths, the putative citizen’s ‘rights’ were ‘granted’. The destruction of a mosque and sanctuary underlined the State’s ability to enforce this policy and the potential violence of which it was capable. A promising line of arguments was proposed by Koentjaraningrat (1993: 9), the one who established Indonesian anthropology, that the politics of tribal religions in Indonesia sustains several purposes.

First, it segregated the two most important governments in Indonesia. Soekarno recognized the value of Marxism for Indonesia, while Soeharto strongly opposed Communism and regarded Communists as Atheists and later labeled Communism the worst ideology in Indonesia.

Second, this policy shifted the confrontation field among major religions in Indonesia. The hostilities between Islam and Christianity about “conversion” and the construction of places of worship were then projected to target ‘non-religious’ Indonesians. The dispersed attentions directed to potential memberships are designed to maintain the harmony of the majority.

Third, the Soeharto government endorsed the missionary projects in the masyarakat adat areas with the assumption that the government indirectly was also ‘contributing’ to the ‘progress’ of the ‘uncivilized’.

Fourth, Soeharto’s government believed that hundreds of the religions of masyarakat adat threatened the government’s political sovereignty, especially those religions with messianistic and populist projects.

Understanding the function of “agama” as a means of containment, the New Order succeeded in inhibiting ‘Islamic-political’ groups and pinning down their political influence. The “sole-ideological-foundation (Pancasila sebagai Asas Tunggal)” policy imposed by New Order in Indonesia (1984) forced many Islamic parties and associations to change or to dissolve their organizations. Many political struggles motivated by Islamic sentiments have been suppressed in the name of ‘national security’. The Christians have been contained in the form of a capitulation under the ‘joint decision’ between the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Minister of Education, and/or the Minister.
of Home Affairs in religious education, the construction of place of worship, etc.

With special reference to the deployment of “agama”, we are now to get a different picture of the politics of religions in Indonesia; the transnational religious movements. Faced with the hardened relationship between the globalized groups and the ‘mainstream’ religious groups, the whole discourse of “agama” again tends to appear as the dominant paradigm of government. Policy regarding the Ahmadiyah, the Jehovah Witnesses, Wahabi, Syiah, Sai Baba, Hare Krishna, Baha’i still is still derived from the working operation of “agama.” An examination of who appropriates the “agama” reveals a division clear in principle, but hazier in fact; that “agama” is a ‘field of power’ in Bourdieuan sense, a multidimensional space of possible positions for the state and citizens.

CONCLUSION

The underlying, simple conclusion of this paper is that the definition of “agama” is not only used to categorize phenomena and objects, but it also creates the things defined (Lambek, 2000). The Indonesian state defines agama in a restricted manner that it (1) be an encompassing way of life with concrete regulations, (2) a teaching about the oneness of God; (3) include a holy book, which codifies a message sent down to prophet(s) through a holy spirit.

The matter of concern here is that the accepted statements about “agama” limit the boundary of what can be said about “agama” and what cannot. The discursive domain of this construction is politics, in which the dominant subjects are the state apparatus. As Foucault rightly stated, the discourse is produced by the power/knowledge regime or regime of truth which follows the rule of exclusion that determines what discourse is allowed, and the mechanism and procedures to produce and maintain the discourse and to decide who has the right to speak.

The discourse of “agama” has been repeatedly used as a strategy of marginalization, a way of scaling down the political rights of “Others” (Peterson and Wolf, 2002: 7). The constitution makers eliminated the diverse and multifaceted forms of religious life in Indonesia to regulate, standardize and operate the nationalistic and even patriotic religious practice and belief the agama. The divisive aspect of a state-sponsored definition of “agama” further becomes the strategy of political control. The state definition of “agama” segregates “kepercayaan” and “adat” from what is regarded as customary and labels it as superstitious or tribal in order to underplay their meanings in social and political life.

“Agama” is also the best measure to ‘contain’ the ‘un-nationalist’ minority the Chinese, the ‘separatists’, the ‘communists’, the ‘fundamentalists’. Once again, religion is the sphere where the Confucians, the Ahmadis, the Baha’is, the Budi Luhur members are fully controlled by the government. All citizen documentation specifies religion, except the passport. These minorities not only have to struggle over their rights to believe and practice their religion, but also their citizenship.

These are obviously examples of a flawed administration of religious affairs. The state appropriation of “agama” has been the main tool to control its citizens. The Indonesian state creates and recreates the discourse of “agama” as the main method to demonstrate state power “agama” is derived from the very ‘construction’ of the state: the state presents in the society through the creation, distribution, and operation of the discourse of “agama”. Disciplinary regulations and categorization of citizens’ religious affiliation are examples of the state “identifying” citizens.

The constitutional writing processes and state religious policy-making gave illustrations of how Abrahamic faiths and institutions are both “agama” and above “agama”. Abrahamic religions (especially Islam) are the condition for “agama”, yet, “Abrahamic” religions are above agama because state-sponsored definitions about “agama” are relevant only for those
considered as ‘inferior’ in beliefs and practices. Defining “agama” is a naming practice, to give a name to the others.

The problem here does not depend on there actually being citizens that have been able to come to terms with the discourse of “agama”. But the establishment of the hegemonic discourse and practices, by means of the state control over the ‘sacred’, of legal statutes and rulings, the discourse of “agama” allows the discrimination and erasure of religious citizens’ identity, who for some reason cannot be integrated into the Indonesian political system. Since then, the appropriation of “agama” has become one of the essential practices of governing citizens of the Indonesian state.

We should be able to learn from the more democratic states in governing religions. We can turn to Slava Zizek. On a rare occasion, Zizek wrote “How China Got Religion”, making comments on China’s State Administration of Religious Affairs Order No. 5 concerning the institutionalization of management for the reincarnation of living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism, which basically “prohibits Buddhists monks from returning from the dead without government permission (Zizek, 2007: 27). In an interesting statement, Zizek argues that this law mirrors the same type of paradox Westerners encounter in the liberal West: that religious belief, the individual’s innermost matter, is regulated by a secular government. Religion, all in all, has been usually contained to the private sphere; where it infringes on the public sphere religion should be ruled and policed.

How do the state and Indonesians make sense of the idea of religious citizenship, in the demarcated spaces of “agama”, “adat”, and “kepercayaan”? The question in these concluding pages can be formulated as: can the discourse of “agama” be disassociated from the state when the most favorable language employed to generate power and authority and a source of legitimacy is the language of the sacred? Is it true that the discourse of “agama” has created a controlling knowledge that generates a powerful state? Do we, as citizens, in reality lack vocabularies, hence resulting in the perpetual eminence of the triadic “agama” “adat”, and “kepercayaan” fascism?

Having thus established a general understanding of how “agama” has been appropriated in Indonesia, I have been arguing that we have been given no good argument for believing that the discourse of “agama” may generate equality for Indonesian citizens. Quite the opposite: we have seen that the discourse of “agama” is undemocratic.

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