NUSA BARONG ON FIRE: Buginese Diaspora in the Island of Evil, 1770s-1800

By: Sri Margana

A. Introduction

In 1770s, an amalgamation of diaspora community had developed in Java’s east coast. They were mainly merchants and sailors from different ethnic groups such as, Buginese, Macassarese, Mandarese, Wajoese, Balinese, Chinese, Sambawanese, Manggarese and Malays. Among this community, the Buginese and Mandarese were the most prominent. They had been actively taken part within “free trading” (a commercial activity outside the Dutch flag) from Bengkulu in the west and South Sulawesi and Flores in the east. The Dutch labeled them as “snokdetar” or smugglers. During the Dutch-Blambangan War (1767-68), especially Buginese, Balinese and Chinese, had actively endorsed the local resistance organized by the local rulers. By the decline of the local resistance in Blambangan in 1773, this diaspora community had developed themselves from merely a “third party” to become prominent actors of the local resistance against the Dutch establishment in Java’s east coast. The resistance was centered in Nusa Barong, a small island which located to the south of Jember, East Java. They managed to collaborate with the local authority to support their movement and to strengthen their opposition.

This paper explores the role of merchant diaspora community within the trade and political movement against the Dutch presence in Java’s east coast and around the strait of Bali in the second half of the eighteenth century. In which interest and to which goals this diaspora community was united and why the Dutch had been the main target of their opposition? How was the fate of their opposition and their establishment in this region? To answer those questions the exploration will be focusing on three issues that linked to each other. The first deals with the “free trade” network and the characteristic of mercantile community in this region and its relation with the local and European authorities. The second part deals with the rise of Nusa Barong as an alternative trading port and the center of resistance by the merchant diaspora community in this region following the decline of the local resistance in Blambangan in 1773. The last issue exami-
the decline of the local resistance in Blambangan in 1773. The last issue examines the fate of community in Eastern Java after the conquest of Nusa Barong in 1777, with particular reference to Madurese and Buginese.

B. The Making of the Buginese-Macassarese Diaspora: A Background

Andaya has vividly described the cause and the impact of Macassar War of 1666-1649, between the Dutch and Bone in one side and Gowa-Talolo on the other side. The war was a reaction of the twin kingdoms of Gowa-Talolo against the VOC who tried to monopolize and kept Macassarese merchants away from the spice islands. The war that was ended by the defeat of Gowa-Talolo brought about wider political and economic impact, not only in Sulawesi, but also in other regions in Indonesian archipelago. After the war, massive Buginese-Macassarese refugees had fleeing throughout the archipelago, mainly to the western part, such as the islands of Sumba, Lombok, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Malay Peninsula and the Southwest Borneo. They tried to seek and build alternative settlement in those regions. In several places, particularly in Malay World, they succeed but in some others, such as in Java and Sumatra they failed.

The fail of Macassarese refugees in Java and Sumatra in the seventeenth century, Andaya points out, was caused by their involvement within the local dispute and the rejection of the local rulers. This happened to the sizable number of refugees (800 people) under Karang Bonjomaran who took refuge to Banton in 1671 and in Makasar territory in 1674.5 The similar story also happened to the Macassarese refuge in Jambi under Daeng Mangika. Moreover, the Dutch viewed the Buginese with their large settlement abroad as continuing threat of the VOC's interest. In many occasions the Dutch had always supporting any action against Macassarese settlements abroad. The Dutch regarded such actions as the first stages of an unfinished war.6

Many conflicts and incidents that experienced by the Buginese-Macassarese refugee had never made them to seek alternative shelters. A century later this phenomenon went on. While they seeking a permanent settlement they were actively involving themselves within the trade activities, both as merchant or sailor. Their knowledge and ability in navigation and seafaring was prominent among the other merchants. Many Javansese merchant in and along the Java's north coast had employed them as a sailor. By the occupation of the British in Bengkulu, they obtained a better opportunity to develop their business. They offered and sold themselves with the British as partner, and to certain level

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as an alliance. By the middle of the eighteenth century their relations had significantly improved. They followed almost any British movement in Indonesian archipelago, especially in Borneo, Sulawesi and around the strait of Bali, and at the same time they managed to set up a sort of network among themselves as well as with other merchants from different ethnicity.

C. The Trade Network in and around the Strait of Bali up to 1767

During the eighteenth-century, three different ports: Buleleng in the north coast of Bali, Kuta in the south coast of Bali and Pangpang in the east coast of Java had played an important role within the trade activity in this region. The port Buleleng was controlled by the realm of Buleleng, and the port Kuta under Badung authority. Both kingdoms had been for a long competing each other. Across the strait, the port Pangpang was controlled by Blambangan which was politically still under the sovereignty of Balinese kingdom of Mengwi.

The foreign trade in Buleleng and Kuta were organized in bandarship system. The Balinese sovereign so-called the rajah controlled the foreign trade but they generally refrained from the direct participation in that trade. The rajah did not possess the marketing networks, the ships and the indispensable overseas connections to conduct this trade themselves. They proffered to mediate foreign trade through non-Balinese intermediaries, usually Chinese, but sometimes Buginese, Arab or European – who were known as bandars. In exchange for an annual rent and occasional gifts a bandar received: the right to establish himself in principality’s busiest trade center, the right to establish shops and storage facilities in other, lest busy, centers. The bandar also has right for certain export and import monopolies, the right to trade in other commodities and collect trade duties.3

The Bandarship Kuta was the most thriving, lucrative and hence the most desirable trade farm to which foreign merchant could aspire. This situation was attributable to Kuta’s favorable geographical location. The village is situated on the narrow, two-miles wide isthmus which connects South Bali to the desolate Bukit Peninsula and had two anchor ages suitable for all manner of perahu and junka as well as square-rigged ships such as schooners and barks, one on the west of the isthmus and other in the east. Kuta was thus little affected by the monsoons and able to accommodate shipping all year around. All the commerce of South Bali, Tabanan, Gianyar, Mengwi and Badung had of

necessity to pass through the port of Kuta.\(^4\) Even during the wartime, Kuta was still a busy port. Bapak Dia, a Buginese envoy that was sent by the Dutch to Bali in 1764 describes the situation of the port Kuta. He witnesses that every day around 18 vessels visiting the port. On the first day of his arrival in Badung, 14 vessels which came from different places in Indonesia Archipelago: 5 from Banjarmasin, 2 from Bengkulu, 2 from Palembang and 6 from Batavia, anchored at the port. Ten days later, few Mandarase merchants came with 4 vessels.\(^5\) Most of those vessels sailed with the British and Dutch flags. The various merchandise that usually were brought to Bali are iron, porcelain, goud draat (gold thread), rattan, curas cajilli (paper?), benzoin, cloth and slaves. A number of Moslem merchants also came there regularly. They brought different color of cottons mainly white, black and red. The merchants from the west such as Batavian merchants came to Bali during the west monsoon, and at the same time the Buginese and other oosterling (Chinese) merchants leaving Bali to the east. Most of the Buginese merchants who visited Bali came from Bengkulu. They brought opium and returned with curas cajilli and foodstuffs. They sold opium with a cheap price: each kati or 2 ½ packet of opium was sold for 7½ Sp. reaal. There were also several merchants from the eastern Indonesia, mostly Ceramese who came with nutmeg and mace. Those merchants were not always interested on local product such as rice, oil and coconut, but they also purchase other goods which were brought by other traders, such as cloth, cotton and opium. They use Kuta as a place for an exchange of goods.\(^6\)

The port Pampang in the east coast of Java was benefited from the growing of the hambarship Kuta and Buleleng. Geographically, the port Pampang was actually not well located. This port lay deeply within the narrow bay of Panggang, behind the cape of Sembulangan. The big ships especially which came from the west through the Madura Strait could hardly reach the port with the west monsoon. Therefore, most of the ships which visited Blambangan were firstly visited Buleleng or Lombok and then sail back to the west through the southern ocean and visited Kuta before came to Pampang Bay. Nevertheless, as witnessed

\(^4\) Ibid, pp. 105-6.
\(^5\) Report by a Buginese Bapak Dia, the Dutch emissary for Gusti Agung Dewa Made the king of Mengwi, Bali, 26 July 1764, Engelhard Coll. 19a. 152. Bapak Dia is a Buginese who was sent by Governor Willem Hendrik van Osseberch to Mengwi but he could not continue his trip because at that time Badung was in war with Mengwi, hence he stopped at Badung until the war over.
\(^6\) Interrogation of Buginese Bapak Dia, Semarang 29 August 1764, Engelhard, Coll. 19a, 152
by the British sailor, Panggang Bay was a well-sheltered anchorage where small ships could be launched.7

Up to the advent of the Dutch occupation in 1767, Blambangan was still under the sovereignty of Mengwi but the Javanese authorized Blambangan to carry out its own trade. Panherg Pati, the last king of Blambangan, had built a fixed connection with a British merchant who lived in Batavia, named Gordon. The latter had regularly sending his Chinese representative to do business with him. Because of the lack of cash money in Blambangan, the trading was still done in barter. The other commercial partners of Panherg Pati were the Sultans of Palembang and Banjarmasin. The latter had also actively sending their emisaries and merchants to Blambangan. However, Blambangan people them- selves did not sail abroad. All the trading activities with foreign merchants were done by brokers who came to pick up and distribute the goods in and outside Blambangan.8 So far, there is no much information about the bandarship-system in Blambangan before the Dutch occupation in 1747. According to Sutanaga, the former patih or chief minister of Blambangan, Panherg Pati was directly taking part in the trade negotiation with the foreign merchants. There were intermediaries but they did not act as bandar who were authorized with certain rights to organize the trade and establish permanent settlement in the port centre as found in Bali. Those intermediary men were the envoys who were sent regu- larly by their merchant lords and get in touch directly with the king.9 The gezagheber of Surabaya, Breton, in his report to the government of Batavia describes Panherg Pati as an intelligent men who fluently read and speak Malay and Chi- nese. This ability allows him to communicate with the foreign merchant directly. His connection with many Chinese merchants who made business with him has influenced his attitude. He always wore Chinese dresses and even behaved as like Chinese.10 His personality mirrors a model of Javanese merchant-aristocrat.

During the period of 1763-1765, Blambangan lost its controlled over its foreign trade due to the political crisis in Blambangan. In 1763, Panherg Pati who tried to liberate Blambangan from Mengwi was expelled from his palace. He tried to seek assistance from the VOC, but the latter refused it. A year later, he was exiled to Bali together with his brother Panherg Wilis. By that time,2

7 These difficulties to visit Blambangan directly are often reported by the Dutch emissaries who were sent there. See Report by indigenous vaandirg, Bapak Banjer, 16 August 1766, VOC 3186, pp. 673-7; Basset, “British Trade and Policy in Indonesia”, 1760-1772, BKJ, 1964.
8 Engelhard, op. cit.
9 The conference between Sutanaga, and Gezagheber Coop a Groen, August 1768, VOC 3248, p. 78-9,
10 Consideration about Blambangan by Hendrik Breton, Surabaja 30 October 1763, Engelhard Coll. 19a.
Blambangan was occupied by the Balinese troops. Two Balinese, Kota Beda and Kaba-Kaba were planted in Blambangan to take over the administration. Since then, the trade in Blambangan fell into the hands of the Balinese and free traders (mostly Buginese, Mandarases, and Chinese). In this chaotic situation the British visited this region to seek any possibilities of establishing commercial post.

**D. Alliance and Competition**

The British presence in this region was part of a solution that they made in connection with the condition of their trading activity in Canton. They had difficulty in paying for its expanding exports of silk and tea from Canton and sought to limit its shipments of silver to China by using South East Asian products as an alternative form of payment. They also hoped to attract Chinese links to an *entrepot* outside the monopoly of the Co-Hong, where the terms of exchange would be more favourably to the British. These solutions to the China remittance problem involved the establishment of a British settlement in the China Sea or the Indonesian archipelago. This scheme involved both the British Company and the British “country traders”. In 1765, the Council of the British India Company had recommended some important ports that deserve to be investigating for this plan as Pasir, Sumboea, Bali and other ports to the eastward.

The British presence in the Strait of Bali brought double effects. The first effect was the re-emergence of the old political competition between two Balinese realms, Mengwi and Karangasem, and the second effect was the increase of free trade activities or what usually called by the Dutch as *smokkel-handel* (smuggling trade).

In August 1766, 3 byg British ships, followed by other indigenous and Chinese vessels: 15 chilagouts, 25 samudra and 160 smaller vessels arrived at Blambangan under the command Edward Coles. A Buginese and Madurese noblemen also were aboard. They intensively approached one Chinese merchant named Encik Lok, to help them to open negotiations with Gusi Agong of Mengwi. The Chinese had been given two pieces of green *jakans* and 2 rolls *armasin* with a request or helping them to get permit from Gusi Agong of Mengwi to purchase rice. By the mediator of Encik Lok, the English succeeded to exchange one pack of opium, 21 firearms and 2 tons gunpowder for 10 *kojaan* rice. Meanwhile, in Blambangan the British brought 20 firearms and 8 of them had been sold. They also purchased rice, buffalos, and cows from the Blambangan ruler, Kota Beda. During this visit 16 buffalos, some *kattis* of rice and large

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12 Report by Bugus Mida, 4 September 1766, VOC 3146, pp. 699-704
amount of timbers of different size were acquired from Gusi Ngarah Kcut, Gusi K描a Beda and Gusi Pasekan.13

Meanwhile, the Balinese rulers tried to take benefit from the British presence for their own political interest. When the British landed at Buleleng, two different factions had approached them offering partnership. The first offer was coming from the king of Karangasem who called for British support for his pending invasion of Bumbangan. The latter temporised by suggesting that the invasion be postponed until December, but hinted that the peaceful benefits to be derived from a British settlement would surpass those of war in Bumbangan. The second invitation coming from the Chinese, Kay Ban, who claimed to have had a conversation with Gusi Agung at Megawi, in which the latter had indicated his wish to see the British Company open a settlement in Bumbangan. This offer made the British eager to see the condition of Bumbangan. Therefore, the further sailing was directed westward to Pangerang Bay, on the east coast of Bumbangan. This visit seems to have been brought to a good impression for the Captain. The Royal George adjourned his voyage to Sumbawa and immediately returned to Bengkulu to discuss the outcome of the journey. But before left for Bengkulu the British sent Kay Ban to Mengwi to obtain confirmation of Gusi Agong's offer. Kay Ban was given some cloth for sale and a perahu to enable him to come to Bengkulu with his report.14

The British expected that their presence in Pangerang Bay would stimulate the local Chinese to resume the arrack and sugar manufacture they had had allowed to lapse and other Chinese immigrants would come to help them. The junkas, which brought the immigrants would stimulate the local trade and provide Chinese goods at better terms that at Canton. The Company could expect to benefit from the sale of iron, steel, copper, saltpetre and opium. The export of sandalwood, and the duties on arrack and sugar manufacture. Finally, a British settlement at Pangerang Bay would allow Company to break the Dutch spice monopoly.

Short after the departure of the first British expedition from Bumbangan, two ships belongs to a British country trader visited Bumbangan also. They also engaged with the local conflict but these country traders tend to support Karangasem's plan to occupy Bumbangan by force. This choice was made after Gusi Agung Mengwi refused their request to send all Pangeran Pati and Wili in Bumbangan.15 Immediately, the plan and preparation of the assault on Bumbangan were commenced.

14 Basset, op. cit., 215.
15 In 1766, the British presented some gifts: 1 gold toker (Javanes: boeker), 1 Ladanjung or Tempat Sird and few pack of opium, to Gusi Agong of Mengwi with friendly request to release both Bumbangan noblemen. But Gusi Agung refused and said
kangan was made. Two English ships, 13 barks, and numbers of Paddawasins were prepared to attack Blambangan. The kings of Karangasem, Tabanan, Badung, Sumapansa and Madurase would be involved within this assault. They also planted a spy in Blambangan. A rumour also says that the British would seek military assistance from Sumatra to support the attack. 10

On the other side Blambangan had built few bentseng along the shore, from the mouth of the River Pampang in the north to the mouth of the River Pakem in the south. These bentseng were prepared to defend Blambangan against the invasion of Karangasem. 11 If this assault were success, the British would build a logje (trading house) in Blambangan. The British discussed this plan with a Balinese from Bululeng, named Endo Bono Yudo. 12 Meanwhile, the Buginese Daeng Cakal was also involved in negotiating with the Mandarase and Chinese merchants in the river Pampang to support this plan. Even, the British had given 1,000 rds, to one Chinese merchant to build a sugar mill and planting sugarcane there. 13

The Dutch believed the British presence in Blambangan might expect more than just rice and timber. The governor of Semarang, Johannes Vos as well as gezaghebber of Surahaya, Coop a Grouw, reacted instantly by sending some spies to Blambangan and Bali to investigate the British movement and collecting information about the local participation there. All of those spies returned with the confirmation, that the British present was not merely distributing opium and cotton but they also want to occupy the land and open the settlement there. However the Dutch still needed more confirmation about the local participation. In that Pangeran Pati and Wills were his own business and he will not let anyone else to interfere it. Report by Salamuddin, 17 July 1766, VOC 3186, pp. 693-8, in that occasion the British also requested authorization to attack Madura, but Gusti Agung Mengwi also refused it because it will invite the Dutch to interfere since Madura is a good subject of the VOC. See, Report by indigenous vandrig, Bapak Banjer, 16 August 1766, VOC 3186, pp. 673-7. 14 Report by Bagus Mida, Semarang 21 December 1766, VOC 3186, p. 457 - 462


17 Ingabey Suro Penolo of Besuki to the commandant of PASURAN CASPER LODEWIJ Tropponggo, 11 Augustus 1766, VOC 3186, p. 707. Se also the previous report, Ingabey Suro Penolo to the commandant of PASURAN CASPER LODEWIJ Tropponggo, VOC 3186, p. 708

18 Report by Bagus Mida, Semarang 21 December 1766, VOC 3186, p. 457 - 462; Ingabey Suro Penolo of Besuki to the commandant of PASURAN CASPER LODEWIJ Tropponggo, 4 September 1766, VOC 3186, p. 705.
August 1766, Governor Vos sent Bagus Mida to Blambangan and Bali to find cut the Blambanganese and Balinese response about the crisis in Blambangan and the British arrival there. In Blambangan the Dutch emissary found disappointment. Kota Beda was reluctant to express his own opinion about the matter, although Bagus Mida had conveyed the gezaghebber promise to lend him 1,000 rls.21

Kota Beda's response brought hesitation, hence the Dutch felt necessary to seek confirmation also from Mengwi. Meanwhile, Gunti Agung of Mengwi responded with wonder, why did the Dutch strongly oppose the arrival of British merchant in his territory. Gunti Agung tried to convince Bagus Mida that the British has no other intention except selling opium, firearms, and retailing textile. Bagus Mida had explained that the British merchants had sold opium with very low price but Gunti Agung made no specific response.22

E. “Smuggling Trade” in and around the Strait of Bali

Another effect of the British presence in this region was the escalation of the free trade activity. Indigenous merchants from surrounding areas were attracted by the opium and cotton that distributed by the British in quite low price. Those merchants came with salt, rice and other foodstuff to be exchanged with opium and textile brought by the British. In fact, opium and textile were widely distributed also by the Dutch, but they preferred to buy it from the British merchants who offered cheaper price. The Buginese and Mandarrese traders had already acquaintance with the British merchants and their mercantilises. Before the British arrive at this region, many Buginese merchants had sailed across to Bengkulu at which the British settlement was established.23 The arrival of the British in Java’s eastern seas, therefore, had shortened their journey. Now, they could easily pick up the opium with minor risk.

These local traders usually sailed without pass as obligated by the Dutch authority in that region. They were also reluctant to pay to the local bandar established by the Dutch. Therefore, the Dutch categorized them as smokkelaar. To avoid the Dutch patrol they used certain strategies. They dared to take a big risk by sailing through the Indonesian Ocean to reach Bengkulu, even with a small vessel only. Another strategy is that they pretending as merely passengers and using the other traders who tolds the pass to sail across from one place to another. In some cases they paid them, but in many cases they did by force.

21 Kota Beda of Blambangan to Ingabai Saro Pensil of Besuki, 23 August 1766, VOC 3186, p. 677.
23 Basset, op. cit.
The experience of Encik Saleh might be able to give more light to the practice of "smuggling trade" in this region. On the beginning of 1766, Encik Sale, a petty Mandarase merchant who had living in Batavia for two years, decided to move to Sumenep. The story about the increasing demand upon salt, rice and other foodstuffs by local and foreign merchants in East Java and Madura had encouraged him to start a new business there. His new business started well. He got a license from the Dutch authority in Sumenep to provide some foodstuffs to be sold to Blambangan. In March 1766, he sailed to Pampang Bay with six other Mandarase and Buginese aboard. He loaded his gonging with one koyun salt and large amount of coconuts to be exchanged with rice in Blambangan. Encik Sale witnesses how Pampang Bay had become one of the busy ports in and around the strait of Bali. There, he found many traders from different ethnicity, such as Buginese, Mandarase, Chinese, Malays and Javanese. He witnesses also the arrival of two British ships which were unloading the opium and cotton. On that occasion, the British also purchased timber, rice and salt. When he was about to return to Madura, 4 Malays merchants approached him. They requested his favour to bring them to Buleleng. Bali. Encik Sale fulfilled the request with a hope that he could get extra income from it. On the way to Bali he encountered with one Company's chialoap which was patrolling around the strait of Bali. Suddenly, some Europeans rose up with firearms in their hands directed to his ship and delivered instruction to show the pass and insisting to land. Soon, he knew that those four Malays merchants brought 20 karis "illegal" opium that they got from the British. Both Malays were captured and together with their opium were sent to Surabaya in 2 perahu. But after a week, there came a report that all the prisoners escaped before they reach Surabaya. The captain intended to go after the escapes and asked Encik Sale to guide him to Buleleng at which all the fugitives might have hiding. However, Encik Sale refused the request. After all that had happened to him he didn't dare to sail to that place anymore.27

The opium trade around the strait of Bali was involving also Javanese and Chinese merchants. Even, several regents were also involved. In January 1767, three regents from the northeast coast of Java, Raden Tumenggung Sura-dinarat of Sedaya, Raden Tumenggung Tirtodirjo and Asta Nagara of Grosik were sent into the landraad meeting in Semarang. Those regents were accused of being involved within the opium trade in Pasir (East Kalfimantan). However, the three regents denied the accusation. They argued that the smugglers had forced

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27 Governor Johannes Vos to Governor General Petrus Albertus van der Parra, 1766, VOC 3186, pp 643.
28 Copy report by Mandarase Encik Sale, 14 October 1766, VOC 3215, pp. 257-259
their merchants to bring over the opium from Pasir to Java. Meanwhile, a similar accusation was also addressed to the regent of Joana, Ngabehi Seba Joyo. Two of his merchants, Tosooy and Bapat Sobro and one Macassarero, Si Muneen, and one Malay, Encik Manan, were captured when the Chinese bandar of Pegirikan discovered a packet of "illeggal" opium in their ship. According to the investigation, they tried to smuggle the opium from Buleleng to Java. The bandar also discovered that those Javanese juragang had sailed without pass. In this landraad meeting, Sebo Joyo could hardly deny the accusation. All those mentioned regents were charged to pay 100 to 300 rds.

The trade of opium was also involving a number of Chinese merchants including the Captain Chinese of Surahaya Han Bwee Kong. According to the Dutch report, one of his juragang, Kan Gasing had sold his ship to the British in Pasir (East Kallimantan), and returned to Java with 1 ½ kist of illegal opium. The further investigation indicated that the mentioned juragang was a fugitive from Batavia. Meanwhile, the Road van Justitie in Semarang was also investigating the case of the discovery of 200 lb. opium in one goning belongs to the Chinese merchant, Thee Kong. This opium, together with two canons and blunderbusses, were originated from Giusti Kota Beda of Blambangan and to be delivered for Giusti Tambao in Buleleng. Another report mentioned about one Chinese merchant from Batavia who sailed to Blambangan with a Javanese and Siaese. The Chinese was known as a sailor of Giusti Kota Beda. He sailed to Blambangan with one goning to dispose the opium to one Blambanganese chief.

The expeditions of two Dutch ships which were departed from two different places: Semarang and Sumeneep, to the strait of Bali also discovered

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26 See the record of the Landraad meeting held in Semarang, 13 January 1667. VOC 3215, pp. 253-256. This meeting was also attended by Johannes Vos, the extraordinary council of Netherlands-India. The Governor and director of the Java's Northeast Coast, Adapati Suro Adi Manggelo the chief regent of Semarang, Raden Adapati Sya-ringat the chief regent of Pekalongan, Raden Tunmenggeng Soemediwirjo the chief regent of Katuwung, Tunmenggeng Soema Nagara the chief regent of Kendal, Tunmenggeng Wira Nagara and Soema Dirijo the regent of Demak, Tunmenggeng Jitro Soeno the regent of Jagara.

27 Copy extract of the record of the Rade van Justitie of Semarang, Tuesday, 28 October 1666, VOC 3215, pp. 249-253. The report is written by Jacob Spigel to Hermanus Munik.

28 Governor Johannes Vos to Governor General Petrus Albertus van der Parra, 1766, VOC 3186, pp.655-6.

29 Governor Vos to Governor General van der Parra in Batavia, 12 November 1666, VOC 3186, p. 439-444.
several amount of "illegal opium". In Besuki, Captain Dekker who led the ex-
pedition of one chidoup and 20 permayangs noticed that no single English ship
was found there but he discovered important evidence that opium had been
widely distributed. In Panarukan, he held one gosling belongs to one Chinese
merchant who lived in Blambangan. The gosling was loaded with illegal opium
and some other goods, such as stroviisake. In the strait of Bali Dekker also cap-
tured some Malays merchants from Bululeng who brought 20 katius opium. From
the captives, he discovered also a letter that saying that the mentioned opium
was ordered by the Cebuene Bandar of Suralaya. At the same place, the expedi-
tion also discovered 15 katius illegal opium in one vessel belongs to Javanese
merchant from Sebayu who sailed from Bali. In this vessel Dekker also dis-
covered 1 1/2 kisit opium which was purchased from the Dutch. According to
the investigation, this "legal" opium was used as pretext for the "illegal" one.

All the reports about the political development in Java's Oosthoek
encouraged the Dutch to take action. They did not want to make another mistake
as they had made in 1764. A necessary action should be done immediately to
prevent any effort to take over Blambangan from the Dutch domination and to stop
any kind of smuggling trade which had ruined the commercial activity under the
Dutch flag. The best way to overcome this situation is occupy Blambangan by
force. In 1767, the Dutch sent military expedition to Blambangan and by the help
of Madhur ino succeeded to terminate the local resistance. Meanwhile, before the
arrival of the Dutch troops, the British merchants withdrew themselves to avoid
the violence and to prevent wider conflict. However, during this invasion two
British merchants were still found in Blambangan, and both were arrested.

The first five years of the Dutch occupation in Blambangan (1767-1771)
was a hard period for the trade activity in Blambangan. This period was coloured
by conflict and rebellions. The trade network that had been established for al-
most a half century badly deteriorated. However, the local mercantilist spirit was

[30 Copy of the copy instruction for the Oppostusman Ian Smit who will sail
across from Sumenep to Bali, VOC 3186, pp. 483-486.
[31 Governor Johannes Van to Governor General Petrus Albertus van der Parra,
1766, VOC 3186, pp. 649-51.
[32 In 1764, the Geraghebeber of Surabaya, Breton had submitted a proposal to
fulfilled the Blambangan request to open settlement there, but Batavia refused it by saying
that the VOC settlement had been extended enough and the plan of opening new settle-
ment was not corrisponded with the VOC interest. See, Considerations about Blambangan by
Hendrik Breton, Soutnabija 30 October 1763, Angelhard Coll. 19a.
[33 There is no further information about both merchants, but according to Basset,
the British authority in Bengkulu denied their involvement in Blambangan. They stated
that those who were involved in the Blambangan affairs were the British "country trader,"
see Basset, op.cit.
not come to an end. By the beginning of 1770s, a group of diaspora community had reorganized their network and established an alternative trading post in the island of Nusa Barong.

F. The Rise of Nusa Barong

Nusa Barong is a small island (6,100 ha) situated around 3 miles to the south of Puger (currently under Jember regency), East Java. The island is a limestone with spectacular cliffs rising to 325m and some coastal mangrove swamps. Most of the island is mountainous; there are several deeply indented bays on the northeast coast, which provide sheltered anchorages for visiting fishermen. Because of its limestone substrate, the island is almost completely dry with no rivers and only a few natural ponds where animals may find standing water. The climate in Nusa Barong is dry with an average annual rainfall of 1,600 mm. There is only a short rainy season, and the southern shores are often exposed to strong winds.

In Blambanganese beliefs, Nusa Barong was the "Island of Evil", in which demons and other dark spirits are living. The Dutch adopts this idea in different meaning, that is, as a place where rebels and smugglers and other rough elements were assemble and organize their bad intention to disturb the VOC's interest in Java. During the war between the VOC and Blambangan in 1676-73, many Javanes and Balinese warriors fleet and stay away into this island. The Buginese and Mandarasee free merchants who sailed across to and from Bengkulu used the island as intermediary port. The British merchants followed this route also, and frequently visit the island to get firewood.

Before the conquest of Blambangan by VOC in 1768, the island had been the important economic resource for Blambangan. The island produces quite significant amount of bird's nests and wax. During the administration of Pangeran Pati (1736-63), the bird's nests in this island were farmed out to the Chinese binder. Although the food crop were hardly grown in this place but the island significantly inhabited. In 1772, 250 families or around 1,000 souls settled in seven villages and five years later the number had doubled. Most of the inhabitants were Javanese, particularly from Lumajang and Blambangan, who took...

26 Similar attribute is also ascribed to the island Nusa Kambangan which located to the south of Cilacap, Central Java and the island of Nusa Penda, to the south of the island of Bali.

27 Gouverneur Johannes Vos to Gouverneur General Petrus Albertus van der Parra, 12 March 1766, VOC 3186, pp. 617.

28 The conference between Sunanagara and Gezagleeber Coop a Joren, August 1768, VOC 3248, p. 78-9.

refuge to this island during the Dutch-Blambangan War in 1767-68. After 1772, the Buginese dominated the population in Nusa Barong. The rest were Mandarese, Wajoese, Balinese, Sundanese, Chinese, and Malays.

After the conquest of Blambangan in 1768, the VOC built a small fortress in Nusa Barong. Few European and Javanese soldiers were placed under the command Sergeant Reebus. The main objective is to prevent the arrival of the free traders and pirates that regularly visited and plundered the bird’s nests in this island.

The arrival of the Dutch stimulates local conflict. Most of the inhabitants were, in fact, reluctant to be subjected by the VOC but they were too weak to resist. The chief of the island, Sindu Kopo decided to submit but the second chief Sindu Bromo disagreed. The latter set up a plan to take over the island. After the end of the rebellion of Pangeran Willis in 1768, the Dutch withdrew Reebus and his troops out of Nusa Barong. The Dutch left no single officer there and the fortress was abandoned. The departure of Reebus encouraged Sindu Bromo to make his plan into reality. He killed Sindu Kopo, who is actually his own step-father, who had let Nusa Barong being controlled by the VOC.

In 1771, another rebellion broke out in Blambangan. This uprising was led by Pangeran Pakis or Rempak. Many outsiders, such as Buginese, Mandarese, Balinese and Chinese integrated themselves with the rebels. In October 1772, the rebel's headquarters in Bayu was destroyed by the VOC, yet the war had not ended. The rebel’s main leaders, such as Basak Endo, Larat, Rupu, Wilendo, Somprong and Kupulogo escaped. According to the Dutch spies, those rebels were hiding themselves in the island Nusa Barong. This information leads the Dutch to pay attention to the island again. In August 1772, the Dutch commander at Gitem, Steenberger, sent three Javanese spies to the island to investigate the rumors. But those spies had never come back to Blambangan again.

Meanwhile, after the death of Sindu Kopo, the new chief of the island, Sindu Bromo, tried to attract traders to come to Nusa Barong again and rebuild the trade network which decline after the Dutch occupation. Regularly, he sent his people to Bali to convince the merchants there about the new situation in Nusa Barong. His effort was not in vein. Gradually, some Balinese and Mandarese merchants visited Nusa Barong again. Jurngan Sinto, a big Balinese merchant from Badung frequently visited Nusa Barong, and a number of Mandarese vessels, big and small, occupied the bay. The bay of Nusa Barong was now become as busy as Pampang.

38 J.A. Steenberger to Adrian van Rijcke, 25 December 1772, VOC 3389, pp. 67-8
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
The Dutch became more concern about the development that taken place in Nusa Barong. On 8 September 1772, Steenberger sent two Javanese, Bapak Jumut and Bapak Sina, to Nusa Barong to investigate ongoing-situation and at the same time to trace the three missing spies who had previously been sent there. Both envoys returned with confirmation about the assassination of Sindu Kopo and the arrest of the three missing spies. However, they discovered no single ship either from Bali or from Bengkulu. According to the local people, Juragan Sinta had returned to Bali when he heard the rumour that the Dutch would attack Nusa Barong and destroy anyone who resist. Nevertheless, Bapak Jumut and Bapak Sina were suggesting to the commandant of Adiraga, to arrest Sindu Bromo who had killed Sindu Kopo, the faithful subject of the Company in Nusa Barong.

Before the Dutch took necessary action toward Sindu Kopo assassination, there had been a significance political development in Nusa Barong. Around October 1772, one big Mandarese vessel under Nahkoda Sabak landed at Nusa Barong. The Chief Sindu Bromo who had been for some times expecting more merchants to come to Nusa Barong warmly welcomed the arrival of Nahkoda Sabak. Moreover, he allowed the Mandarese to build a house in Nusa Barong. Nahkoda Sabak was so please with this offer but at that moment he had so much time to stay in Nusa Barong. Therefore, he left the job to build the house to one of his followers, named Juragan Jani. He expected that the house would have been ready when he came back to Nusa Barong. So far, Juragan Jani had been very loyal to him and Nahkoda Sabak put fully trust upon him. Therefore, before his departure for Bengkulu he also left some firearms and ammunition to Juragan Jani.

It seems that Juragan Jani was not as good as Nahkoda Sabak had ever thought. With such a big authority and trust, Juragan Jani became bigheaded and greedy. First he married the two daughters of the chief Sindu Bromo and assertively pushing the chief to hand over the island Nusa Barong to him. Moreover, he abused the trust that his leader had given to him. He ignored Nahkoda Sabak's order to build the house and taken over the island from Sindu Bromo. Now Juragan Jani became the chief of Nusa Barong. He occupied the former Dutch fortress in Nusa Barong and strengthened it with more 60 firearms, 3 tons gun-

41 J.A. Steenberger, the post-holder of Gieem to the Commandant Rijcke of Pasuruan, 23 December 1772, VOC 3389, pp. 67-8
42 Ibid
43 In Nusa Barong, Juragan Jani married with the daughter of Sindu Bromo and the daughter of Sindu Ongko. See. Copy report by Bapak Sieran and Bapak Samie, two Javanese who were born in Nusa Barong and living in Lumajang, 7 February 1777, VOC 3499, pp. 171-6.
powder and 4 small canons. He increased his armada with 50 Mandarase vessels, one puncaling, 3 padowakans and more people to Nusa Barong.⁴⁴

On 8 November 1772, the Dutch sent two emissaries, Bapak Rosman dan Bapak Trino, to Nusa Barong. The aim was to insist Juragan Jani to surrender Sindu Bromo who had killed the chief of the island. However, this effort was in vein. Both emissaries were unable to meet Juragan Jani or other prominent juragans. Juragan Jani was leaving for Brikki or Kawa, in the Sultan’s territory, together with Sindu Bromo and Juragan Babolo to purchase rice and other foodstuffs. Meanwhile, Juragan Baguwo was sailing to Badung to collect more guns and ammunition.⁴⁵

It seems that Juragan Jani tries to make Nusa Barong more than just an intermediary port but also as a fix settlement or even a small “empire”. He strengthened his fortress with more guns, ammunition, warrior and foodstuffs. To organize all these necessities he sent his sailors to some places, especially Badung. This place was one of the favourite ports for the free traders, outside the Dutch territory. In March 1773, Juragan Jani sent four vessels under Juragan Babolo, juragan Sinto and Juragan Kolo to Badung, to bring over ammunition and more families to Nusa Barong. They returned to Nusa Barong with 15 families or around 70 souls from Meru, in the south coast of Java. Among these families were the Wajoense rebels, Bagus Jawat and Bagus Bezo.⁴⁶

The increasing demand on foodstuffs, guns and ammunition for Nusa Barong encourages some traders to provide the mentioned merchandise. Juragan Makole, a Macassarese merchant who lived in Badung, was one of the guns and food supplier for Nusa Barong. To collect this guns and ammunition Juragan Makole linked himself with some pirates from the island Kangian. By the mediation of these Kangianese, Juragan Makole could meet the Batavia gun’s trader, named Eski Tiroyo, to whom he bought half pikal gun powder, one pikal ammunition, and four firearms (diamderbussens).⁴⁷

Now, Juragan Jani became more and more powerful. He got more guns and ammunition in his fortress and also more people had immigrated to Nusa Barong. With all of them, now he felt more powerful and started to exercise his hiding plan. He sent his people to plunder the bird’s nests along the Java’s coastal areas, such as Meru and Sabrang and some small island to the south Java such as Gunung Pager and Dedali. It was very often that these actions invite several

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⁴⁵ FredeRijcke Fischer to Pieter Luzac, 27 December 1772, VOC 3389, pp. 73-4.
⁴⁶ FredeRijcke Fischer to Pieter Luzac, 5 March 1773, VOC 3389, pp. 129-71.
⁴⁷ Copy report by Javasse Oesin, Semarang, 22 March 1774, VOC 3389, pp. 243-4. Oesin is a Javanese sailor from Semarang who worked for Juragan Makole. He was captured by the VOC’s patrol at Grajaen, on the way to Badung, Bali.
incidents with the local people. The first incident was taken place on 22 Fe-
bruary 1773 at Gunung Meru in the south coast of Java. At that time, Juragan Ja-
ni and his people in two big vessels and 5 jukungs plundered out the bird's nests
at Gunung Meru. They were armed with pike and firearms. Their action was dis-
covered by Bapak Roman, the chief of Sbrang who was hunting the escaped
rebels along the south coast of Java. Bapak Roman and his followers who were
trying to stop his action were attacked by Juragan Jani's people. In this attack,
Bapak Roman and his brother were killed and six of his followers were captured
and the rest ran away to the hill. Two days later, Bapak Samprnit, one of the six
men who were captured by Juragan Jani at Gunung Meru, escaped.**

After this incident, the Dutch intensified their patrol along the south
coast of Java. Since then, more incidents that involving both parties were more
often occurred. In October 1773, Juragan Jani's people which aboard in 9 pera-
hus landed at Puger and attacked the Dutch ship which was patrolling along the
shore. They were armed with 40 firearms and 50 pikes. In this clash many people
were killed from both sides. On the VOC side, 8 people were missing including
two matrities from Passurun, Wiorkroso and Wioproono, one village chief Wiro-
joyo and other 5 soldiers. On the other side, many of Juragan Jani's people were
drowned when their ships were crashed to each other because of the strong wind.
Those who were able to reached the shore, secured themselves by climb up to
the hill around Wedi Alit, and the rest returned to Nusa Barong with 4 other pe-
rubah. The other morning, 13 vessels from Nusa Barong came back to that place
to trace the five missing perahu and the people who might have survived from
that incident.***

The Dutch commandant of Adiraga, Fischer, believed that the continu-
ous arrival of ships and people in Nusa Barong indicates that a new courage of op-
position has re-emerged. Fischer suspected that this was parts of Juragan Jani's
strategy. He pretended to behave and speak friendly to the VCC (he had shown
his cooperation with the VOC before by arresting one of the escaped rebels,
Kapulogo to the Dutch), but at the same time he prepared his ships at the shore to
plunder and kill and then renaway as fast as he could. Therefore, Fischer urged
to set up a military campaign to destroy the island as soon as possible.**

** Ibid.
*** Apart Letter by Veendrij Fischer, the Commandant of Adiraga to Gesagheb-
ber Pieter Luyze at Sovernlia 31 October 1773, VOC 3418, pp. 98-9.
**** Frederik Fischer to Pieter Luyze, 20 January 1773, VOC 3389, p. 141.
G. The Vague Tummmegung

In October 1776, another political change took place in Nusa Barong by the return of Nahkoda Sabah and the mysterious death of Juragan Jani. The arrival of Nahkoda Sabah in Nusa Barong this time was to punish Juragan Jani who had neglected his job and manipulate the trust that he had given to him. It seems that Nahkoda Sabah had been informed about the behaviour of Juragan Jani in Nusa Barong. However, before he could arrest Juragan Jani, the latter had run away with his two wives and few of his adherents. The objective was the Island Nusa Barambang which, located to the south of Banyumas, under Surakarta territory. Their arrival at that place was reported by the regent of Banyumas to the op-perhoofd of Surakarta, Stralendorf, in November 1776. The report also mentions that those Mandarese bought the body of his own captain, named Jani who died on the way to Nusa Barambang. Stralendorf suspected that the mentioned Capta-in Jani which was mentioned in this report was the Mandarese who occupied the Island Nusa Barambang. Immediately, Stralendorf sent a Javanese oppoisseur named Merto, to pick them up and bring to Surakarta. However, when Merto arrived there, they had left Nusa Barambang. According to the local people, Juragan Bundu, one of Juragan Jani's followers, decided to bring the body of his captain back to Nusa Barong. They sailed to Nusa Barong with four pirogues that they bought from the local people. Few days later, came another report that the men- tioned Mandarese have landed at the south coast of Cirebon because two of their ships were missing on the way to Nusa Barong, precisely at Segoro Wedi. The oppoisseur decided to go after them but the Dutch commandant in the south coast of Cirebon prevented him and said that they were merely traders, hence, unneccesary to chase them. Three days later, the Mandarese continued their journey to Nusa Barong and buried the body of Juragan Jani there.

The death of Juragan Jani that was so sudden remains mysterious. There is no apparent information that there had been a violence effort to capture Ju-ragan Jani or any fatal attack or accident on the sea before he could reach Nusa Barambang. Perhaps, Juragan Jani was betrayed by his own follower, quite possible Juragan Bundu himself whom might be hopeless to go along with Juragan Jani to find a safe shelter. Juragan Bundu might has killed his own juragan and uses the dead-body as a "guarantee ticket" to re-enter juragan safely. Per-haps, that is the reason why Nahkoda Sabah did not make any demand upon Juragan Bundu when he came back to Nusa Barong.

51 Copy report by Bapak Siem's and Bapak Samie, two Javanese who were born at Nusa Barong and living in Lumajang, 7 February 1777, VOC 3499, pp. 155-6.
After the death of Juragan Jani, Naskoda Sabak took over the island. He declared himself as the new chief of Nusa Barong under the title Tumenggung Mancanagara. According to Naskoda Sabak, the title was awarded by the Sultan of Mataram. 32 "Tumenggung" is a title that is usually given to the patusi or regent of Mataram's outlying province or mancanagara. "Tumenggung Mancanagara" literally means the "Regent of the Outlying Province." So far, there is no single evidence that mention about an official relationship between the Sultan and Juragan Sabak. The available documents merely mentions about the trade relation between Buginese-Mandarese merchants and the Sultan’s subject in Rawa. The inhabitants in this district had been the close partner of the Buginese-Mandarese merchants, especially in rice trading. However, it is still questionable whether or not this trading was carried out under the knowledge and the authority of the Sultan. Perhaps the adoption of the mentioned Javanese title was part of his political strategy. Naskoda Sabak tries to legitimize his power over Nusa Barong as a legal occupation, both in the eyes of Nusa Barong’s people as well as the Sultan’s subjects. By claiming himself as the subject of the Sultan Nahkoda Sabak might be expecting the deterioration of the relationship between the VOC and the Sultan of Mataram which for that moment was still vulnerable from the conflict.33

H. Nusa Barong Expedition, 1777

The political development in Nusa Barong had been the main concern of the Dutch authority in Blambangan and Sumbaya since 1773. A military expedition to Nusa Barong had been planned when the incidents that involving the Dutch patrol and the Juragan Jani’s people in the south coast of Java increases. Nevertheless, the governor of Semarang insisted that the expedition would only be carried out when the appropriate preparation had been made. At that moment, in Semarang there was lack of ships to support the expedition. At the same time, the war in Blambangan had not yet come to an end, and the work of removing the capital city of Blambangan to Banyuwangi had just been started. The Dutch and the people of Blambangan still concentrated themselves to build the new fortress in Banyuwangi as well as the dalem (house) of the new elected regent.

32 Copy report by Bapak Sieman and Bapak Samie, two Javanese who were born at Nusa Barong and living in Lumajang, 7 February 1777, VOC 3499, pp. 175-6.
33 At that time the VOC was facing a difficult situation in dealing with the case of Raden Ayus Bandoro which involving the three Javanese raja in Central Java, Sultan, Sultan and Maagsikemera. The Dutch were worried that this case would deteriorate the peaceful situation that so far had been reached after the long successful war which involved the three party and the Dutch. About the situation in Mataram see Rijckheoffs, Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkunegara. (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).
In 1777, a real movement to invade Nusa Barong was made. Hundreds of soldiers which were collected from Bangil, Probolinggo, Pauroan, Malang and Bambangan had been departe'd to the Gitten and Plindo at the southeast coast of Java. However, without obvious reason, the expedition was postponed. This pen- dant invasion invites a lot of complaints from the inhabitants because they were forced to provide the daily foodstuff for the indigenous soldier who took part in this pending expedition. After more than half year delayed, the expedition was finally carried out in August 1777.

On 17 August 1777, the first Dutch fleet landed at Nusa Barong under the command Adriaan van Rijck. At the bay of Nusa Barong the troop were split up into two directions. First unit under Vaandriks Kregel and Martin was sent to the bay of Kamal, and the second unit under Commandant Van Rijck himself was departed to the bay of Jeruk. In both places the Dutch troops engaged with Jura- gan's Sabak people who had expected their arrival. The attacks were launched from the ships as well as from the ground. But the war in both places was not last long, after few hours the bays of Kamal and Jeruk were taken over by the Dutch. In this battle 27 rebels dead and many other wounded and the rest were run away to the hill. The fortress and houses were burn down. On 18 August, most of the Dutch troop took a rest and the rest were clearing up the traps set up by the ene- my. On the following days, the Dutch troops were split up into several directions to hunt the enemy on the hills and wilderness. A week later the Dutch troops discovered 33 Buginese, Mandarase and Balinese warriors who were hiding in the wilderness. Most of them were wounded during the battle and the Dutch de- capitated them all. One Buginese Jarragan, named Rakia, was among them. In other places 19 rebels were arrested.

During the attack on Kamal and Jeruk, Juragan Bundu and Juragan Sapu and 18 other Buginese and Mandarese escaped but they were captured by the Dutch troop at Gitten when they landed at Plindo in Java's shore. Meanwhile, the chief Sindu Ogggo and two others penghulu surrendered themselves to the Company. They came as representatives of other Nusa Barong's people who had similar intention. Most of them were women and children. By the arrival of these people the Dutch had arrested 98 people. From Juragan Bundu the Dutch knows that the chief of Nasa Barong, Sindu Bromo was still alive. He left Nasa Barong with his followers one night before the attack on Kamal and Jeruk. Meanwhile, the Quartermaster Joseph Boceti informed that he had destroyed some

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55 Copy missive from the chief of the expedition to the Island Nusa Barong, Adriaan van Rijck to the gezaghebber of Soehayba Rudolph Florentinus van den Nierop, 1 September 1777, VOC 3528, pp. 367. The summary of this report published also in de Jonge, XI, pp. 293-4. See also Rapportes van het hoofd der expeditie tegen Noeess Barong, Adriaan van Rijck to the Gezaghebber te Soehayba, 18 August 1777, in de Jonge, XI, pp. 291-3.
perahu which were used by the rebels to escape from Nusa Barong, and Sindu Bromo might be afloat in one of the perahu. " However, the death of the chief had never confirmed.

In Nusa Barong, the Dutch succeeded to destroy all the rebel’s fortresses but most of the main leaders escaped. Few days after the conquest of Nusa Barong, the regent of Malang, Karta Nagara, informed that the rebels who escaped from Nusa Barong had landed at Pulo Sempu under Malang territory with 14 vessels and reorganize their movement there. Actually the Dutch has predicting that the escaped rebels might use this island as alternative shelter. Therefore, along with the Nusa Barong’s expedition, the Dutch also deployed 50 Javanese soldiers there. However, Corporal Adam and some Javanese troops who were located there failed to prevent their arrival. They were driven out from the island by the rebels, and now they withdrew themselves into the Forest Dragoonco.

The governor was very grateful for the outcome of the Nusa Barong’s expedition, but he had still worry about the development in Pulo Sempu. He expected that Commandant Van Rijck could destroy the enemy as soon as possible. The governor was also anxious that in Pulo Sempu those escapes had concealed more ships that they could use to reach the Island Nusa Barambang in Cirebon territory and rebuild their power there. Besides Nusa Barong, Nusa Barambarg had also been functioned as intermediary post by the Buginese and Mandarese merchants who sail from the eastern Indonesia to Bengkulu. The Governor urged to anticipate the return of the Buginese and Mandarese merchants which usually return to the east during the months October-November. It is reasonable that their solidarity might encourage them to unite themselves with the rebels. Therefore, the governor supports the idea to make a further expedition to the island Pulo Sempu and Nusa Barambang. To support this expedition, the governor had spent his own money to buy six small perahu.

The Gezaghebber Van der Niepoort had a similar idea but for that moment he was still waiting for further report from the commandant expedition Adriaan van Rijck. The gezaghebber was suggesting to Commandant Van Rijck if the attack on Pulo Sempu were necessary, he would send Vaandrig Mulder, which was currently in Pasaman, to support this assault. There is also a report from the local people that in the island of Pulo Sempu the rebels had set up some firearms and small canon at the shore. Therefore, Van der Niepoort also urged all

36 *See also Van der Niepoort, 26 August 1777, VOC 3499, pp. 391-2.
37 *See also Van der Niepoort, 28 August 1777, VOC 3499, pp. 385-7.
38 *See also Van der Niepoort, Semarang 25 August 1777, VOC 3499, pp. 385-7.
the chiefs in Sultan's territory, such as Kediri Kalingbret, Rawa and Lodalem, to guard their shore against the arrival of the rebels or to prevent them passing through their territory. The gezaghbeber would also send one small ship to provide some foodstuffs for the Company's troops at Batu Ulu.  

Finally, the military expedition to the island Sempu was done in 29 August 1777. Vaandrig August Muller was in charge to lead the expedition together with the regent of Malang Tumenggung Karta Negara and the local chief Ingabe Jaksa Kusumo. The expedition was involving 74 Europeans military and 120 Javanese. Most of the rebels were captured and the rests were killed.

**H. The Demolition of Nusa Barong**

Short after the conquest of Nusa Barong, Gesaghbeber Van der Niepoort submitted a proposal about the management of the bird's nests in the islands of Nusa Barong, and the surrounding areas, such as Gunung Pager, Dedali and other places along the southeast coast of Java, to the Governor in Semarang. Van der Niepoort proposed to farm them out to the Chinese farmers. The Captain Chinese of Surabaya Han Bwee Kong and his brother Han Tik Kong had interested to this offer. To attract the local support, few part of the outcome of the farming would be given to the local chiefs. So far, they were unable to enjoy the harvest of the bird's nests in their territory because of war and robbery. Van der Niepoort tried to assure Governor Burgh that those chiefs would be grateful to him if this policy were taking place because they would be able to enjoy the benefit from their own property again.  

This proposal was approved by the Governor and the contract was signed in the end of 1777. The collection of the bird's nests in Nusa Barong was farmed out to the Captain Chinese of Surabaya Han Bwee Kong for 1,550 real Sp, and in western Blambangan to his brother Han Tik Kong for 850 real Sp. From both contracts, the Dutch expected to earn 2,400 real Sp, per year, and 500 real Sp. if it would be distributed to the regents or chief of four districts, namely.

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59 Gesaghbeber R.F. van der Nieport to the Governor J.R. van der Burgh, 31 December 1777, VOC 3528, p. 7. The bird's nests in Banyuwangi was counted also in this proposal but so far there had no confirmation from the Regent Wiriguno.

60 Governor J.R. van der Burgh to Batavia 13 January 1778, VOC 3528, pp. 3-4.
The regent of Lumajang 100 real. Sp
The regent of Malang 100 real. Sp.
The chief of Sabrang 50 real. Sp.
The regent of Blambangan 250 real. Sp.
Total 500 real. Sp.

However, these two contracts were not last long. Ten months after the conquest of Nusa Barong Governor Burgh came with completely different ideas. Apparently, the outcome of the management of the new conquest island did not satisfying the Dutch as well as the Chinese revenue farmers. The harvest of the bird’s nests from Nusa Barong was very low. At the same time, certain pragmatic considerations have led the Dutch to change its policy with regards to the island Nusa Barong. In 1778, the Governor submitted a proposal about the abolition of the Company’s settlements and the demolition of the Island Nusa Barong. This proposal was made after reviewing all the cost and benefit that the Company had spent and earned from the island. The governor came to the conclusion that Nusa Barong is an “arm illand,” poor and unprofitable for the Company. He indicated some important reasons. Secondly, the island itself produces no valuable products because of its unfertile soil. In many places, the layer of soil that adequate for agriculture was very meagre. In the island was found only 60 pieces of coconut tree, few mangos and nenas, keniirs and pinang trees. In the island there was only one well, with bad quality of water. On the hill there were only a few gogo or dry rice and maize field. The local inhabitant usually plants kapas (cotton), tobacco, rice, katjang buncis (bean) and other vegetables, and the rest were wilderness without任何 product. The only worthy product from this island is the bird’s nests, but since the last five years, the production have significantly decline. Each year, Nusa Barong only produces 1800 pieces of nests or the highest level was 3/4 pikal. This outcome was not worthy enough compared to the huge and expensive efforts that the Dutch had made to keep the robbery away from the bird’s nests sites which located seven miles from the Java’s shore.

65 Governor van der Burgh to Batavia 18 May 1778, VOC 3328, pp. 67-87. See also, Report of the value and condition of the Island Nusa Barong by Rudolph Florentinus van den Nieoprt Chief Merchant and the Gezaghebber of Java’s Oosthoek, 17 and 18 August 1777, VOC, 3528, pp. 99-104.

66 Ibid.
Thirty, maintaining the Dutch settlement there are also very costly because the position of the island itself is vulnerable from the foreign attack. To defend the island from such attack requires many troops and ships. Since the occupation, the Dutch had spent a lot of money to provide foodstuff and other necessities for the European troops who were located in several fortresses in that island. The governor also mentions about several Dutch ships that were now regularly to provide foodstuff to that island had repeatedly failed to reach the shore and returned with the spoiled food. 64

Finally, the expedition and the occupation of the island Nusa Barong had also affected the surrounding districts. The gezaghebber of Surabaya has received reports and complaints from several regents and indigenous chiefs that many people of several districts, such as Pasuruan, Bangli, Banger, and Besuki have fled away from their village because of the high oppression and burden to which Company has laid upon them to provide regular food supply for the indigenous troops of each district who help the Company for the expedition. 65

Based on the above-mentioned considerations, the governor concludes that the occupation of Nusa Barong is worthless, and hence would not be maintained. The Dutch would not allow any occupation, even with the sign of the Company. Nusa Barong must be cleared up from the inhabitant and any kind of plant and good that allows the people to live. All the settlements should be burned down, including the Dutch fortresses. The 90 Europeans and 350 indigenous soldiers who were placed there would be pulled out from the island. The bays Kamal, Jeroek and Samin in the north coast of Nusa Barong would be fortified. The rest of the bird’s nests that still remained would be harvested and no one are allowed to foster them again, if there were more bird’s nests found there, all the regents in the western Blambangan are obligated to destroy them. To guard Nusa Barong from any illegal occupation and to protect Java’s east coastal areas, more security posts would be built along the shore, such as Klata near the river Puger, Batu Ulu near by the river Mayang, Wedi Atit and Batu Kajang. The post Plink which located around 1/2 mile from Nusa Barong would be functional as the main post to guard the ships movement between Nusa Barong and the Java’s south shore. A routine patrol would be carried out to prevent the pirate that

64 See Governor J.R. van der Burgh to Batavia 3 January 1777, VOC 3528, p. 3. The panuwang De Ana Maria and six others indigenous panuwang failed to land to the island Nusa Barong because of the bad weather. All the food that they brought to support the military there were spoiling. Now all the ships had returned to Banuwangagi.

65 Ibid. See also apart letter by Chief Merchants and the Gezaghebber of Surabaya Rudolph Florentinus van den Nieport to the Governor Semaran Johnnes Robert van der Burgh, 16 September 1777, VOC 3528 pp. 110-111.
would try to rob the bird's nests along the Java's shore (Wedi Aki and Masong), Gunung Pager, and Dedali.\footnote{\textit{Bid.}}

The Dutch authority in Batavia considered this proposal as the most reasonable way to reduce the Company's financial expense, and to avoid more troubles in Java's east coast. Therefore, the proposal of the demolition of Nusa Barong was approved and on 18 August, promptly on the one year anniversary of the conquest of the island the demolition was made into reality. Vandrig Nobel and few Japanese were in charge to carry out this work.

1. The Fate of the Merchant Diaspora in Java's East Coast

The demolition of Nusa Barong brought about a deep impact on the "free trade" and the movement of the free merchants throughout this region. For almost a decade since the demolition, the Dutch authority in East Java kept on preventing any illegal occupation by foreigners, particularly the Buginese and Mandarese, both in Nusa Barong as well as in the Java's south coastal areas. Meanwhile, the Buginese and Mandarese merchant were also kept themselves away from this territory to avoid more violence.

By the late of 1780s, the Dutch gradually alleviated his policy against the immigrant. Moreover, the resident of Banyuwangi promised to give a certain amount of incentive to the family who willing to migrate and settle at Blambangan. This changing policy was made due to the problems faced by the Dutch authority in Blambangan to exploit the new conquest territory, this is the lack of human resources. The series of wars and rebellion which lasted almost a decade had caused two third of the population in Blambangan perish. The Dutch realized that even they could conquer this rich region but they could not make any benefit out of it without the inhabitants. The importation of the inhabitants from the surrounding regions was parts of the solution to overcome this problem. At the beginning the Dutch made a preference to import people from Madura and the Bawean Island which had been the faithful subjects of the Company. However, this policy was unsuccessful. Although the Dutch had promised them an incentive but people from those places were reluctant to migrate. Finally, the Dutch decided to accept any other immigrants, including the Buginese and Mandarese, who were voluntary coming to settle in Blambangan.

By the beginning of 1790, the Dutch authority in Blambangan allowed a number of Mandarese families to settle at Puger, (currently under Jember regency) with close supervision of the local rulers. They were provided with a plot of land and obligated to plant certain food crops and coconut trees. Among them were elected a chief that would be responsible to organize its community. The chief was awarded the rank "captain". The first chief of the Mandarese peo-
ple in Puger was Captain Buton. One of Captain Buton's grandchildren who was interviewed by Hageman in 1840s, describes his grandfather as proficient leader and very loyal to the Dutch. Under his leadership, the Mandarese society in Puger was able to transform the areas to be used to a wilderness to become a prosperous village. He also succeeded to attract more Mandarese and also Buginese merchants and sailors to migrate to this place. In few months the Mandarese and Buginese settlers were developed also in Wedi Aloit and Rajegwesi.

Nonetheless, this success story was not last long. Misunderstanding, and perhaps, the shadow of the past had spoiled their relationship with the Dutch which was at that moment just to flourish. This premature break-up was caused by the incident that was well known by local the people as “Geger Oro-oro Besini”, a tragic incident that cause of the death of Captain Buton.

This incident was taken place in 1793. At that time, one Dutch ship was robbed and landed at the south coast of Malang, precisely at Rajegwesi. The captain of the ship called to the son of Captain Buton, named Pilor. The latter was sent to Pasuruan to inform about the incident to the Dutch authority there. The situation was so urgent, yet the man was expected to come had not shown up. Therefore, the commandant sent Vaandrig Willem Phaff and the son of the regent of Pasuruan and other few followers to bring over Captain Buton to Pasuruan. The order was written in bad Malay by Pathi Surawiyaya, the man who hated and oppressed the Mandarese people. In this written order is stated that the Vaandrig Phaff must bring over the “Kepala Orang Mandar” (literally means “the head of Mandarese people”), to Pasuruan.63

Meanwhile, Captain Buton was so envy of his son who had been trusted by the Dutch to carry out such important mission. He decided to go after his son, accompanied by his two followers, to Pasuruan. He didn’t know that actually the Dutch emissaries were on their way to meet him. In Oro-oro Besini (a swamp area), precisely at the village Kepu, Puger, both parties met each other. Actually, Vaandrig Phaff, who was heavily dazed by brandy, did not aware that the man who was just about to pass on his way was Captain Buton. On the other side, Captain Buton moved down from his horse to give respect to the Dutch vaandrig. This made Vaandrig Phaff recognized him as Captain Buton. Suddenly, the vaandrig delivered an order to attack against Captain Buton. The latter moved back to avoid the attack, but it was too late. A piece of pike had stabbed right on

63As told to Hageman in 1861, by the grand son of Captain Buton and one villager of Menampu, who buried the body of Captain Buton. According to the Mandarese people in Puger, Wedialat and Rajegwesi, Captain Buton had three children, who died in Banyu and Bali. On 4 July 1861, Hageman with the two grandsons of Captain Buton, Tara and Mangkus, discovered the tomb of Captain Buton at village Kepu. See J. Hageman, “Java’s Oosthoek, Madoera, Bawean: Historie en Aardrijkskennis, 1746-1808-1816,” Deel II (Unpublished manuscript, 1808), KITLV, D.H. 118, p. 77.
his chest. The Captain fell down and immediately beheaded by Vaandrig Phaff. With full of victory, Vaandrig Phaff brought "the head" of Captain Butoon instead of the chief of Mandarase people to Pasuruan. 48

The two followers of Captain Butoon who witnessed this incident ran away, and packed all of his transportable things into his vessels and left the settlement. The whole people at the settlements were apprehensive, and leaving the settlements altogether. The sons of captain Butoon: Ploho, Palimo and Patoani fled to Bali and Bone. Since that incident, there were no more Mandarase and Buginese people who dare to return and settled to those places again. As witnesses by Hageman, seventy years later the place had turned to become a wilderness again. 48

J. Conclusion

The political and economic movement of the diaspora community in Nusa Barong commenced by the Buginese-Mandarase in 1770s was part of continuous endeavours which had started more than a century before. The involvement of other ethnic groups, particularly Wajoese, Sambawanese, Manggararœ was also a long-standing pattern. These groups had been the main allies of the Macassarœ (Gowa-Talle) during the Macassar War (1666-1669). Their movement was a direct opposition against the Dutch establishment and parts of an old conflict or in Andaya's term "unfinished war." The support of the Balinese was, perhaps, a particular one. Even the Balinese had the same attitude toward the Dutch intervention in Java's east coast, but their endorsement was based more on the economic reasons rather than political. Many Balinese merchants had been benefited from the effort of the Buginese and Mandarœse to establish their settlement in Nusa Barong.

Particularly in Blambangan, the movement of this diaspora community taking shape in robbery and other violence actions against the Dutch and its subjects. To attract the local support and to legitimise their power, they tied themselves with the local by married the local women, as the case of Juragan Jani, and adopted the local political rank, as the case of Nahtoka Sabak.

At least a decade after the conquest of Nusa Barong, there had been a changing attitude by the Dutch authority toward the Buginese-Macassarœ migrants. Even the 'awanese elite, such as Pahlit of Pasuruan Sorawijaya, was still hardly welcome this community, but the Dutch had alleviated its policy toward the Buginese-Mandarœse migrants. With a special treatment and supervision, the Dutch provided them a place and gave them opportunity to establish. However, the Dutch had also never paid a fully trust to the Buginese, hence the limitation.

48 ibid. 77.
49 ibid., 78
was also made. According to the contract between the VOC and Captain Buton, no more than 200 souls were allowed to settle. Another reason why the Buginese-Mandarese were allowed to inhabit in this region was because the Dutch desperately needed people who could be encumbered to take a responsibility to secure the birds' nests along the south coast of Java against the robbery and piracy. As also strongly stated in the above-mentioned contract, that the main function of Captain Buton was as protector of the Company's most precious property in the southeast coast of Java, namely birds' nests. 38 And in his short career, he had done his best for the Company. 39 Misunderstanding and the shadow of the past had still the main obstacles of the relationship between the Dutch and the Buginese society in this region. The story of Captain Buton was parts of this apprehensive relation. He was the first and the last Buginese-Mandarese captain in Blambangan who was elected but also tragically terminated by the Dutch.

38 Copy contract between Captain Buton and the VOC, 19 January 1790, VOC 3910, pp. 286-288.
39 Captain Buton had involved himself in several expeditions against the piracy along the Java shore. See the Journal of Adriaan van Rijck during the expedition against the pirate together with Captain Buton, in the South Coast of Java, 12 December 1789-26 January 1790, VOC 3910, pp 289-300.
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Governor J.R. van der Burgh to Batavia 13 January 1778, VOC 3528

Governor J.R. van der Burgh to Batavia 13 January 1778, VOC 3528

Governor Johannes Vos to Governor General Petrus Albertus van der Parra, 1766, VOC 3186

Governor Johannes Vos to Governor General Petrus Albertus van der Parra, 1766, VOC 3186

Governor Johannes Vos to Governor General Petrus Albertus van der Parra, 1766, VOC 3186

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Report by Bagus Mida, Semarang 21 December 1766, VOC 3186

Report by Bagus Mida, Semarang 21 December 1766, VOC 3186

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Report by indigenous vaandrig, Bapak Banjer, 16 August 1766, VOC 3186

Report by indigenous vaandrig, Bapak Banjer, 16 August 1766, VOC 3186

Report by indigenous vaandrig, Bapak Banjer, 16 August 1766, VOC 3186
Report by indigenous vandrig, Bapak Banjer, 16 August 1766, VOC 3186

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APPENDICES

I. The main Juragans of Nusa Barong (Source: Reported by Adriana van Rijckie, VOC 3499, p. 383)
1. Nahkoda Sabaak alias Mancanagara (escaped)
2. Nahkoda Babobo (escaped)
3. Nahkoda Swoek (escaped)
4. Nahkoda Bogo (escaped)
5. Daling Krusk (escaped)
6. Nahkoda Mauzer (arrested)
7. Nahkoda Bondoe (arrested)
8. Nahkoda Sappa (arrested)
9. Nahkoda Rakia (dead)

II. The main figures of the Nusa Barong revolt from different origins who escaped from the island. (Source: Reported by Adriana van Rijckie, VOC 3499, p. 3834)
1. Sindu Bromo (the chief of Nusa Barong)
2. Bappa Rotikut (the brother of Sindu Bromo)
3. So Truso (the brother of Sindu Bromo)
4. Bapak Mandor
5. Bapak Djalin
6. Bapak Impir
7. Bapak Breek
8. Bapak Penkoes
9. Bagus Djawat, (Wajorese)
10. Bagor Gudrik, (Wajorese)
11. Mas Karti, Lumphangese, (long has settled in Nusa Barong)
12. Mai Bende, Lumphangese, (long has settled in Nusa Barong)

III. List of prisoner from the Nusa Barong expedition 1777 (all the prisoners were sent to Batavia in October 1777) (Source: VOC 3300, p. 31)

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