MARXIST vs LIBERAL: Who Is the True Guardian of Freedom?*

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Liberalisme dan marxisme adalah dua paham yang mewarnai perjalanan pemikiran-pemikiran dunia. Seiring dengan dinamika pemikiran-imaianismus, dua paham tersebut menjadi bagian dari kehidupan sehari-hari yang menjadi dasar kehidupan umat manusia dalam menggarisakan segala sikap, kebijakan, dan pemikiran. Kedua pola diskursus tersebut akan kita kaji dan uji coba kebijakan dan strategi suatu negara dalam melaksanakan "dilan ter" pada perilaku dan cara berdiri (grand narrative discourse).

Dalam mengatakan, mewarisi, dan menggeneralisasi konsep kepihakan, pola negara, pilihan kebijakan ekonomi, dan hak kepentingan warganegara, konsep kebijakan nasional menjadi dasar komitmen pada kehidupan paham-paham tersebut menggarisakan kebijakan seorang negara.

Kemudian, yang berkembang sekarang adalah, seiring dengan dominasi liberalisme dalam kehidupan manusia, liberalisme dipahami dan diyakini sebagai paham yang mengandalkan teregulasi dan pembatasan dalam kehidupan warganegara. Menjadi kejadian umum bahwa liberalisme merupakan ideologi yang menentukan warganegara dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Konsep politik kehidupan dan kebijakan pribadi merupakan simbol pemikiran dari liberalisme sehingga "the rule of law and freedom". Sedangkan, marxisme, lebih populer dengan tesis tentang perburuan dan "pembuatan kekaisaran negeri". Teori yang berkembang dijadikan dasar argumen bahwa marxisme membantu jalan yang sangat perlu dan kehidupan yang bebas seorang warganegara. Hal ini yang menjadi solusi atau alasan paham yang dapat membedakan marxisme tidak menjadi ideologi pilihan dunia.

Pemahaman semula, berakhir persperapan kebijakan dalam kehidupan manusia lupa dari roman, otos, dan pandangan alam marxisme. Apakah marxisme memang menempelkan manusia dalam posisi yang terkikis? Maka konsep kebijakan yang digariskan marxisme masih membawa kebijakan manusia itu sendiri? Tujuan ini diadakan dengan menjalani bagaimana suatu kebijakan tertentu yang berkaitan dengan penjelasan yang tepat tentang

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Introduction

The discussion of freedom is complex: in the number of problems which have been considered, the variety of doctrines or theories which have been advanced, the range of issues to be found, and the types of argument involved in the debate of these issues. Its complexity cannot be fully assessed at all these respects at once.

Furthermore, it would be difficult to find a basic notion over which the Marxist and the Liberal appear to be more divided than that of human freedom. This point of ideological conflict has been so obvious that it has even been endorsed by the matter-of-factness of language, which has accepted the characteristic of 'freedom' as a basis for classifying Marxist and Liberal: the latter being referred to collectively as the 'free group', with the implication that the former are somehow unfree. In short, one of the most basic and broad argued disputes between the Marxist and Liberal concerns the question — who is the true gran-dain of freedom?

It must be emphasized at the very beginning that it will not be my concern to establish whether either the Marxist or the Liberal and their general ideology are inimical or favourable to the social and political freedom of man. Such a study would have to be based on broad empirical data and would necessarily have to take into account the social, historical, political and cultural factors which contributed to the formation of either communism or liberalism as a concrete entity.

I shall, therefore, limit myself to assessing the concept of freedom, only in terms of the number of conflicts between Marxist and Liberal. My point of departure is the body of theoretical doctrine which is known as Marxist philosophy and comparison will be made to the prevailing Liberal doctrines that dominates an ideology of many nations.

Before examining the meaning and interpretation of freedom which will later be expanded upon in an analysis of the theory of government, the market and private property, this study first discusses some problems which are particularly relevant to Marxist theory of freedom. This is because there is a common opinion that human freedom is denied or explained away, or that the deterministic principles of Marxist philosophy effectively exclude the possibility of freedom. More is well known as a severe critic of the classical Liberal conception of freedom. He pretended to have "unmarked" the class content of Liberal freedom and accordingly rejected its claims for universal significance. Finally, this paper will be concluded by assessing 'the persistent discrepancy' between Marxism's emancipatory ambitions and the repressive actuality of its practice.

Keywords: capital, capital; communist doctrine; human freedom; liberalism; Stalism; Marxism
Reasons for scepticism regarding Marxism and freedom

No one of the most striking features of most literatures, with the exception of Marxology, is their consistently critical attitude. For one reason or another, the Marxist view is taken to task, and the total picture which emerges is decidedly negative. That is, it is asserted that the whole Marxist philosophy of history and man, as well as his vision of the communist society of the future, do not revolve around the problem of freedom. There are some reasons appear, those are:

(a) Perhaps the most frequently voiced objection to Marxism is that which points to the incompatibility of freedom and historical determinism. Marx is well known as the founder of historical materialism—a deterministic (or quasi-deterministic) theory of social development which stresses that all human ideals are class bound and dependent on economic interests and that socioeconomic systems cannot be freely chosen, since both their sequence in time and their inner logic is always subject to objective necessity independent of human will.

(b) The ontology of Marxism is dialectical materialism. This means that it sees the unity of the world in its materiality. Now Liberal critics have maintained that such an ontological materialism rules out freedom. What lies behind this critique is the view that while all material phenomena are connected with one another in ambiguous and fully determined relations, in the realm of the human spirit there is an openness, a relative indeterminacy within whose limits the person can function as the source of his own decisions and actions. Without this autonomy—exactly what the Marxists allegedly deny—freedom seems to be excluded.

(c) Marx powerfully influenced the course of history as a prophet of communism, a utopian visionary for whom communism meant "truly human freedom." The individual has reality only insofar as he exists within the whole of the "universal." Consequently, the person, who falls under the category "individual," has no autonomous being; he is not a subsistent subject but a mere moment in the structure of a larger whole.

(d) A fourth critique claims that the Marxist's own explanation of freedom is itself a rejection of the true meaning of the word. It is pointed out that Engels accepted as valid the Hegelian thesis that freedom is "insight into necessity.

It is easy to note the inner connection between Marx's critique of Liberalism and his historical materialism, as well as between his vision of communism and his historiography of freedom. As a critique of the bourgeois worldview and as a "materialistic" interpreter of history, Marx was rather cynical about freedom, seeing it as a heliodon known forms as illusions of consciousness, if not conscious deception, and mercilessly unmasking their "class context.

But in his communist utopia, as well as in his general philosophy of history, Marx attached central importance to freedom.

Freedom

The notion of freedom plays a central role in the thought of Karl Marx. The notion of freedom lurks behind the critique of religion and the whole description of the forms of economic alienation (O'Rourke, 1974).
Freedom was conceived by him not as an absence of external coercion or constraint like Classical Liberalism think, but as the ability to live in accordance with man's essential nature, that is, as the opposite of dehumanisation (Waldick, 1995). Thus, on the Marxian theory, the subject of freedom is man as a social being, in the sense that his proper activity is to define himself positively to the other members of his species. Since man is essentially a social being, he achieves his freedom by positively affirming and developing his concrete social relations, i.e., in the family, the community, the state, etc. Social action is the proper sphere of realisation of human freedom. Consequently, freedom can finally be described as the self-realisation of man as a species being, insomuch as he consciously fulfils his own social nature by treating his fellow men in his daily existence as ends in themselves.

However, although freedom is characterised as a social category, this does not mean that it applies only in society as a whole; it applies also to individuals. Marx had conceived the personal realm of freedom to be a condition in which the individual was engaged in the developing and perfecting of his human capacities through activities freely chosen and pursued for their own sake. In the Liberal conception, freedom consists in the maximum absence of restrictions on the actions of individuals. It affirms the principle that an individual ought to be able to do as he pleases in the course of his own private pursuit of happiness, so long as his actions do not conflict with the similar pursuit of his neighbours. Laws become merely a set of rules indicating the boundaries within which a man may continue his activities. Outside of these boundaries, he, as an individual, is absolutely free from the interference of other men and institutions.

For Classical Liberal, there is no place for altruism. Here, then, is the famous passage from Berlin's 'Two Concepts of Liberty':

I am usually said to be different from the degree in which man is unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from using what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree inferior; and if this area is constrained by other men beyond a certain minima, I can be described as being censored, or it may be, enslaved (Berlin, 1969).

Mars very vehemently rejected this conception not because, as Hegel, individual freedom has no reality except as a part of the whole, but because the Liberal view misstated the negative tendencies of man, his egoism, for his true essence. Man is not correctly defined as homo lupus, in the Hobbesian tradition. This definition characterises only the negative relation of men to one another, which does not serve to distinguish men from animals. It is rather men's positive relation to each other which is characteristically human. Thus the Liberal concept of freedom went wrong because it was based on a false anthropology, one in which men were conceived as isolated monads. In fact, it is of man's very nature to live together, cooperate.

Positive and Negative Freedom

Negative Freedom

The Kant's concept of freedom has one obvious shortcoming: it refers only negatively to one's follow-men in the barrier to one's individual freedom. This was probably the reason why Isaiah Berlin called it negative freedom, which simply means an absence of coercion. Negative
freedom may be interpreted either in a narrow political sense or in a broader philosophical sense. If one decides for the narrow interpretation, it means only an absence of political coercion used by an individual, a group, a social class, an institution or the state against another individual, group or class of people.

As far as freedom in the narrow sense is concerned, it fully fits in the traditional Liberal stage of the state. All people, even those who are not employed by free enterprise, are protected against an outside political coercion interfering with their right to pursue their own concept of happiness. Capitalism was the first socio-economic system which institutionalized, through its Liberal concept of the state, this concept of freedom in a universal manner. Moreover, Liberal capitalism was also the first socio-economic system which abolished extra-economic coercion to work. People have become personally free. They have to work only if they are forced to work by economic necessity.

In this lies the basic Marxist objection against the Liberal concept of freedom which distinguishes freedom unevenly. Unequivocally, those who are not forced to work by economic necessity have more freedom than those who have to earn their livelihood. If a man is deprived of his own means of production and is forced by economic necessity to sell his labour power to work for the owners of the means of production, he may still be free according to the narrow interpretation while unfree according to the broad interpretation of negative freedom. Indirect economic coercion to work is not only characteristic but also indispensable for capitalism: the very system could never have emerged and evolved if each individual had his own means of production.

On the one hand, the Marxists do appreciate that capitalism humanized the economic necessity by having made coercion to work not much more humiliating. On the other hand, the Marxists do not ignore the fact that while the market is the only known unsanctioned device of labour guaranteeing each individual a choice to whom, and under which conditions, he sells his labour power, the capitalist market is unable to guarantee for all those who want to work. Hence the problem does not suffer as much from (induced) economic coercion to work as it does from lack of job security.

The limitation of Liberal concepts of freedom to politics only has made the Liberal distribution of negative freedom unequal. The class of the owners of the means of production has far more freedom from coercion in the broad sense than the proletariat. Moreover, the former has much more social power than the latter. The owners enjoy control over the labour and products of the non-owners. While formally equally free, the two main classes of capitalist society are in fact unequally free. The inequality is caused not by politics but by economics. Therefore, the main work of the 'abolition of the present state of things' consists in an equalisation of economic freedom rather than in an abolition of universal political freedom. One must not forget that Liberal capitalism protects the working class also from political coercion. Its basic norm is that in that while it is able to give workers political security, it fails to give them economic security.

Positive Freedom

Positive freedom denotes that man is free not from something (coercion) but for something. Along the lines of his simple
definition, positive freedom implies participation, subjectivity, autonomy, creativity, development and self-determination. In the Marxian terms, positive freedom means the all-round development of man. Marx's concept of positive freedom could seem very close to that of Kant. Both for Kant and for Marx, man is his own purpose. For both of them, man is to be free, to be 'himself' in the sense of self-determination. And finally, in both concepts, man's human development is an end in itself. At this point, however, all resemblance ceases to be meaningful and the principal distinctions between the two concepts become transparent. While Kant's man is conceived as an abstract individual with an autonomous free will to make absolute laws for himself, Marx's man is a social being able to change of circumstances of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationalised only as revolutionary practice. Hence, Marx's concept of man's human development is a revolutionary concept which can be materialised only under certain circumstances:

Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognised and organized his 'forces proper' as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished (Marx, 1969).

This is, of course, quite different and rather a collectivistic concept of man's self-determination. On the one hand, in order to make the individual free, one has to make free a large social entity (a class, a nation, mankind). On the other hand, freedom of all cannot but be based on freedom of each individual. The dialectic of the individual and the social is an inseparable part of Marx's concept of liberty. Thus, the right of man to liberty has to be deducted from the association of man with man rather than from the separation of man from man, from life in a historical community where man considers himself a communal being, rather than from life in civil society where man considers himself a private individual.

The State and The Role of Government

For classical liberal, the basic roles of government in a free society are to provide a means whereby we can modify the rules, to mediate differences among us on the meaning of the rules, and to enforce compliance with the rules on the part of those few who would otherwise not play the game.

The need for government in these respects arises because absolute freedom is impossible. However attractive anarchy may be as a philosophy, it is not feasible in a world of imperfect men. Man's freedom can conflict, and when they do, one man's freedom must be limited to preserve another's—as a Supreme Court Justice. The major problem in deciding the appropriate activities of government is how to resolve such conflicts among the free-dom of different individuals. In the economic area, a major problem arises in respect of the conflict between freedom to combine and freedom to compete. Obviously, the role of government is greatly expanded by interventionist liberal-als. The role of government considered is to do something that the market cannot do for itself, namely, to determine, arbitrate, and enforce the rules of the game. They
may also want to do through government some things that might conceivably be done through the market but that technical or similar conditions render difficult to do in that way. These self-interested acts in which strictly voluntary exchange is either exceedingly costly or practically impossible. There are two general classes of such cases: monarchy and similar market imperfections, and neighborhood effects (which actors of individuals have effects on other individuals for which, it is not feasible to charge or recompense them).

According to Marx and Engels, every state has its (political) content and its (government) form. In terms of the content, every state is the dictatorship of the ruling class. To be a member of the ruling class does not mean that one has to hold a governmental position. It is enough that the personal power of individual class members is, at the same time, also their social power. Since the economic power of the ruling class is a precondition for its political power, every member of the ruling class takes part in the total power exercised by the class as a whole.

It is important to note that although Marx emphasized the autonomy which the sparcity of spiritual reality individual posses, this does not mean that they constitute some sort of objective being, separate from man. They are no more are types of human spirit, because, in effect, spirit is necessarily human. The spirit, press, and morality are forms of the realization of human faculties.

But how to apply Marx’s theory of the state to a post-capitalist society? The answer stems to be readily found in the concepts of the dictatorship of the proletariat and that of the withering away of the state. After the ascent of political power, the proletariat establishes its class dictatorship whose basic aim is to build a classless society. With this task accomplished, the state begins to die out, to wither away. Eventually it will be subsumed by a community in which political power is dissolved into economics and power over people has been replaced by the administration things (Schumpeter, 1979). However, the picture is not as clear as Marx and Engels would have liked to believe.

For one thing, Marx and Engels conceived of every state as the dictatorship of the ruling class and not as the dictatorship of the government. In Continuous Manifesto, Marx and Engels said that “the first step in the development by the working class into mass the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle for democracy.” (Marx and Engels, 1969).

But what about the state? One ought not to be surprised by the ending of the quotation from the Communist Manifesto, i.e., to win the battle for democracy. Democracy, as Marx might very well have known, means no more or less than rule by the majority, by the many as compared to sovereignty as rule by the few, and to monarchy as rule by the one). Since Marx and Engels were certain that, at the time of socialist revolution, the proletariat would be in the majority, this very notion of democracy merely suggests that the dictatorship of the proletariat is to be rule of the majority, by the majority, and for the majority.

Rose Luxemburg, a representative of a revolutionary and yet democratic wing of European Marxism, was always the foremost advocate of a democratic interpretation of the ambiguous Marxist concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. “Yes, dictatorship! But this dictatorship consists in the process of applying democracy, not in its elimination…” (Luxemburg, 1961). For her, the dictatorship of the proletariat was by
definition 'a dictatorship of the class, not of a party or of a clique—dictatorship of the class, that means the broadest public form on the basis of the most active, unlimited participation of the mass of the people, of unlimited democracy' (Luxemburg, 1961). She even went as far as any Liberal would go: 'Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of one party—however numerous they may be—is no freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently' (Luxemburg, 1961).

What is the main task of the proletariat today? To abolish classes through the expropriation of the means of production form the bourgeoisie. The elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class is by no means identical with a physical liquidation of the capitalists. It simply means that the bourgeoisie would be deprived of its privilege to private property and put on an equal footing with the proletariat. This measure, directed only against one of the many liberal freedoms, the freedom of private property, might be carried out, as one may easily imagine, in a civilised way, with the approval of the majority and, therefore, in quite a democratic manner (Marx, 1974).

The Market

Capitalism is the only known economic system in which the market has become the universal regulator of the economy and market relations have extended over the entire society. That is why a traditional Marxist critique of capitalism is, at the same time, a critique of the market.

Under capitalist conditions, the market equality of people is rather formal and one-sided. It concerns a mere equality of men as exchanging subjects in the economic sphere and, if reflected in politics, a mere equality of men before the law in the political sphere. It does not concern either the distribution and use of property or the distribution and use of power. Workers selling their labour power are only formally equal to capitalists who buy it. In fact, they are unequal as compared with the bourgeoisie: the very existence of the proletariat stems from the fact that this social class is the only one within capitalist society which is denied the right to private property. If proletarians owned the means of production, they would cease to be proletarians and would become private producers. Thus, the denial of private property to the proletariat is a principle which turns market equality into inequality for working class.

Marx's philosophical and economic condemnation of the market is of much greater importance. The core of the philosophical condemnation consists in Marx's concept of alienated labour (Sch帅气, 1979). Alienation of labour caused by commodity and market relations lies in the fact that the producer ceases to be concerned with the use-value which he has created, with the concrete existence of his product, with its meaning, significance and usefulness, and is concerned merely with its exchange value, primarily from the quantitative point of view.

The alienation of man from his labour goes hand in hand with the externalisation and objectification of man and his labour. Social division of labour and market (commodity) relations dehumanise labour which used to be the basic mark distinguishing man from other animals.

There is, however, yet another dimension of alienated labour caused by the very existence of the market. As far as wage labour is concerned, the worker creates values not for himself but for the capitalist who has purchased his labour.
power (a commodity being sold and bought on the labour market) and who, therefore, appropriates the result of the work. The producer of exploited labour (unpaid value) is alienated from the worker: it does now belong to him but to a capitalist. That is why Marx suggests that only when the capital relationship growing out of the market is abolished, will the capitalist form of alienation vanish; only when the market relationship is superseded and commodities again become mere products without mystery, will the market form of alienation disappear; and only when things come to rule over man, will the market form of the externalization and objectification of man disappear (Marx, 1974).

Why then was Marx so preoccupied with the abolishment of commodity production, the market and the law of value immediately after the socialist revolution? The answer lies in Marx's concept of freedom in the economic sphere. The most authoritative statement concerning this concept was made on the last pages of the third volume of Marx's key work, Das Kapital:

In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; that is, the very nature of things lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. As soon as the savage was able to chase the dangers he had to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, as our civilized man, and he must do so if to those social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development, this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but in the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom, so this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins the development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom which, however, can blossom forth only with the realm of necessity as its basis. The shortcoming of the working day is a basic prerequisite (Marx, 1974).

This somewhat pessimistic conclusion might be avoided if one interprets the common control of man's interchange with Nature not as mere social planning but in a different manner. The possibility of a new interpretation is indicated first of all in the above-quoted paragraph. Common control of production processes 'most favourable to, and worthy of, human nature' might simply mean that the society is able to introduce automation of the entire industrial production by 'a technological application of science' (McLellan, 1971).

If so, then the old industrial division of labour would actually disappear and men would be freed from labour as an objectified activity. The realm of necessity (material production) would still remain the basis for the realm of freedom without using people as direct labourers by employing them merely in the capacity of social planners and controllers of the production process. Although this work might still be called 'objectified' labour, it could be proportionally distributed among all the associated producers and the working day, week, month, year could be shortened to an insignificant minimum.

Nevertheless, the concept of a non-market socialist society cannot turn the formal and partial equality and freedom of the capitalist market into real and universal…

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nal equality and freedom. By abolishing the market without destroying its roots, especially the social division of labour and scarcity, the social foundation of equality and freedom disappears. This dilemma was not solved by Marx, although he recognized it. Marx's philosophical objection against the market (that the individual has an existence only as producer of exchange-value, hence the whole negation of his normal existence is already implied) (Marx, 1973) is irrelevant, since as man produces within the framework of the social division of labour and scarcity. Even if man's product ceases to be an exchange-value, it will remain, as long as the social division of labour prevails, a product for others. And conversely, the products of other men will become, owing to the same social division of labour, products for him. If this barrier is to be equal (and Marx would agree that it should be equal), the determination from exchange-value would be neither formal and the negation of man's natural existence would be implied as well.

Furthermore, as early as the founding of planned economies, "bourgeois critics" had warned that nonmarket economies would prove themselves enviable (Marx, 1975). The argument was that the market, "the free exchange of commodities, was indispensable for economic rationality. Only the market could provide a pricing mechanism that might serve as the basis for the rational allocation of the factors of production and the distribution of products. Only a rational pricing system would allow calculations essential for a comparison of the relative costs of production and discrimination between alternative options and appropriate methods. Rational choices are to be made between a multiplicity of constantly changing and competing ends in any modern industrial economy. Nonmarket systems cannot allocate scarce factors of production without waste. They cannot avoid the mistakes that obstruct the production of more desired goods and that regularly fail to deliver goods to end users in a timely fashion. For decades the advocates of planned socialist economies insisted that the problem of rational calculation could be adequately performed by state agencies. As early as 1939, Maurice Dobb admitted that while "some problems of economic calculation and of allocating productive resources between different uses clearly exist for a socialist economy," (Dobb, 1955) Marxist theorists such as Oskar Lange had solved the problem; some illiquid market supplements to the planned economy would allow the necessary calculations. A "market socialism" would resolve the problems that admittedly attended nonmarket economies. The notion was that a planned economy, utilizing some market devices, could restore "objectivity" to the productive processes of socialism, ensure efficiency, foster allocative rationality, inspire creative innovation, and provide adequate incentives. The viability of socialist economies could be assured by some kind of market adjuncs.

Private Property and Communism

For Marx, under the property relations of the economy, the workers are compelled to perform surplus labor, the product of which is appropriated by the owners of the means of production. Thereby the workers are exploited by the owners. Stated differently, exploitation refers to two facts. Surplus labor is extracted from the workers, by which they become exploited agona. The product of surplus labor is appropriated by the own-
eral the means of production, by which they become exploiting agents. Both facts are due to the property relations of the economy. Hence, the abolition of private property was tantamount to a general human emancipation.

The abolition of private property would provide a positive solution to the struggle between objectification and self-alienation, enabling working people to appropriate the objects created by them by liquidating the autonomous power of these objects and reducing them to the obedient organs of the extended body of humankind.

Conceived in this way, communism in Marx's view, signified the final end of the drama of self-enriching alienation, "the positive abolition of private property and thus of self-alienation and therefore the real reappropriation of the human essence by and for man" (Marx, 1862). It is therefore, the return of man himself as a social, i.e., really human being, a complete and conscious return which transcends all the wealth of previous development.

Corresponding to his concept of the wealthy man is Marx's view of the difference between the scale of having and the sense of being. "Private property," he says, "has made us so stupid and partial that an object is only ours when we have it, when it exists for us as capital or when it is directly eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc., in short, utilized in some way. Although private property itself is itself evidences these various forms of possession as means of life and the life for which they serve as means is the life of private property — labor and creation of capital." (Marx, 1862).

The aim of society, for Marx, is not the production of useful things as an end in itself. Once easily forgets, he says, "that the production of too many useful things results in too many useless people" (Marx, 1862). A distribution of economic outcomes (consumption possibilities, opportunities for getting an education, leisure, etc.) among the members of society is the automatic result of this society's distribution of the personal condition of production (labour power) and of the material conditions of production (capital goods and natural resources).

Under capitalism, Marx said, labour power is owned individually, whereas land and capital is held by a small number of non-workers in the form of private property. Small wonder, then, that those who own nothing else but their labour power are driven to the low and of the income distribution, given that they are sufficiently numerous, relative to the available capital stock, to contain a large 'surplus population' among their ranks. In dismissing any reformist programme that tried to correct this result of capitalist property relations by political means not affecting the distribution of ownership itself, Marx asserted that in a communist society, the material conditions of production would be the "collective property of the workers themselves. From that distribution again, a different distribution of consumption would automatically result.

While Marx's insistence on the fundamental link between property rights to resources on the one hand and entitlements to final goods and leisure on the other is of course valid, the distribution of the latter is by no means the automatic result of the distribution of the former. Given what the property relations permit people to do with their property rights to resources, the outcome distributions depend on what people then actually choose to do, and in particular, on how they respond to incentives. It is also misleading to suggest, as Marx often did, that the prop-
enty relations of capitalism automatically go together with a highly unequal distribution of wealth.

To be sure, if a (hypothetical) capitalist regime were to start out with wealth equally distributed, then it can be predicted that the inequality of wealth characteristic of existing capitalist societies would tend to emerge spontaneously after some generations. But this would be due to the way in which people unequally endowed with labour power, and unequally visited by luck, used their initially equal shares of producible property in pursuing their different plans of life.

Yet I think that the difference between capitalism and communism that Marx had in mind when counterpointing the two systems in terms of how each distributes the 'conditions of production' escapes this criticism. In my view, Marx wanted in essence to contrast the ethical point (without explicitly making it), that the communist system of co-operative property which he envisaged would at least have the property of institutionally excluding certain kinds of morally inadmissible outcomes in distributions, distributions which the capitalist system of private property in variably generated.

Conclusion

This study has only briefly touched upon a liberal concept of freedom because its primary purpose of this study is to investigate and describe the theory of freedom in Marxian tradition. As a consequence it has become evident that a good part of the common people's critique is based on a lack of information or understanding of the relevant texts. This phenomenon is interesting in itself: the tendency to characterise the Marxian view as deterministic may very well have been influenced by broader ideological considerations. Freedom is a political and economic concept as well as a philosophical one. And their doctrine of the unity of theory and practice would imply at least that the two would correspond in some way. But this does not prove to be generally the case; only with regard to the socio-historical concept of freedom might any significant connection be drawn between theory and practice.

I shall argue however that Marxists have to explain why a theory which is extremely critical of the state leads in practice to the formation of repressive political regimes. To claim that this development is simply the product of unfortunate circumstances ignores the irony of socialism which claims to do more than 'scientifically' articulate historical circumstances. A contradiction between theory and practice is not accidental but derives from the way in which Marxists postulate communism as the predetermined outcome of events and the proletariat as the preordained agents of revolution.

In retrospect, given the advantage of hindsight, it seems clear that the central problems of socialism in the twentieth century arose out of the ideological commitment to a planned, nonmarket economy. The costs paid in the service of that commitment include a failure to retain timely information essential for rational calculation. The lack of relevant information distorts administrative behaviour in a grotesque fashion. Political rule becomes, and remains, increasingly dictatorial. Exponential pricing generates the shortage, sectoral and intersectoral imbalances, and static and dynamic inefficiencies that characterize socialist systems (Prybyla, 1950). The subsequent decline in real growth and development, the increasing alienation, and the ultimate stagnation of
such systems were unintended consequences of the abandonment of the most fundamental market modalities that have facilitated rational calculation and sustained growth in the industrial democracies. The attempts to implement the speculative programs of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the twentieth century have resulted only in the anachronism of Stalinism and Nationalism.

References


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Marx-Engels (1965), *Selected Works in One Volume*.


